Competitive Prices Act.
Sponsor

- Progressive Groups$78k
- Climate & Environment$1k
Full profile: /officials/S001205
Source: Congress.gov · FEC
Cosponsors (2)
Members who have signed on to support this bill since introduction. Source: Congress.gov.
Latest Action
The most recent step in the bill's legislative path. Committee Activity below shows referrals and reports; the full action-by-action history including floor proceedings lives at Congress.gov →
Committee Activity
Currently in
- House Committee on the JudiciaryReferred To · 2026-04-30
Previously
- Judiciary CommitteeReferred To · 2026-04-30
Plain-English Summary
This bill would change how courts handle antitrust cases involving companies that charge similar prices, making it harder for plaintiffs to prove that competitors illegally coordinated their pricing without direct evidence of an agreement. The legislation clarifies what counts as an illegal conspiracy under antitrust law, potentially protecting companies from lawsuits based solely on the fact that they happened to set prices at similar levels. The change would affect businesses facing antitrust claims and consumers who rely on antitrust laws to prevent price-fixing.
AI-assisted summary generated from the official bill metadata (title, subjects, actions) sourced from Congress.gov. Cached and reviewed. Always verify against the official text linked below.
Subjects
Full Bill Text
Verbatim text published on Congress.gov via GovInfo. Use Cmd+F / Ctrl+F to search within this excerpt.
[Congressional Bills 119th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.R. 8633 Introduced in House (IH)] <DOC> 119th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 8633 To specify the standards governing claims of consciously parallel pricing coordination in civil actions under the Sherman Act, and to clarify the meaning of contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy under the Sherman Act. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES April 30, 2026 Ms. Scanlon (for herself and Mr. Nadler) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To specify the standards governing claims of consciously parallel pricing coordination in civil actions under the Sherman Act, and to clarify the meaning of contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy under the Sherman Act. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Competitive Prices Act.'' SEC. 2. PLEADING AN ANTITRUST VIOLATION THROUGH PARALLEL CONDUCT AND PLUS FACTORS. (a) Definitions.-- (1) The term ``antitrust laws'' means the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1, et seq.), the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12, et seq.), and the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41, et seq.). (2) The term ``parallel conduct'' means two or more persons acting similarly to raise, lower, maintain, stabilize, or manipulate price, output, capacity, supply, or other terms of competition for reasonably interchangeable commodities or services. Parallel conduct need not be uniform and can be varied in timing, method, and amount. (3) The term ``person'' has the meaning given the term in subsection (a) of the 1st section of the Clayton Act (5 U.S.C. 12(a)). (4) The term ``plus factors'' means allegations other than parallel conduct supporting the inference of a conspiracy, including-- (A) a motive to coordinate efforts to raise, lower, maintain, stabilize, or manipulate price, output, capacity, supply, or other terms of competition for the purchase or sale of reasonably interchangeable commodities or services; (B) actions that would be contrary to a person's unilateral economic self-interest absent a conspiracy; (C) departure from prior pricing methodology and practices; (D) exchanges of competitively sensitive information; (E) price or output levels unexplained by cost, supply, or demand; (F) an opportunity to conspire at industry events, conferences, trade association activities, or through any other meetings or venues; (G) past collusive practices; (H) an invitation to participate in a common scheme, including by public signaling of pricing, output, capacity, supply, or other competitive strategies, or offering of a method to engage in parallel conduct; and (I) market conditions conducive to coordination, including high market concentration, high barriers to entry, high exit barriers, inelastic demand, or fungible products. (5) The terms ``State attorney general'' and ``State'' have the meaning given in section 4G of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15g). (b) Standards of Pleading and Proof.--In a civil action, including an action brought by the United States, the Federal Trade Commission, a State attorney general, or any person seeking damages or injunctive relief for violations of the antitrust laws-- (1) when opposing any motion to dismiss a complaint, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or any other motion challenging the sufficiency of the allegations, a claimant-- (A) plausibly states a claim by alleging parallel conduct and the presence of two or more plus factors; (B) need not allege direct evidence of a conspiracy; (C) need not allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action; and (D) need not allege a theory that is more plausible than one offered by defendants,…
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as the court at the pleading stage must only consider whether the allegations are plausible, not whether an alternative explanation is equally or more plausible; and (2) when opposing any motion for summary judgment, motion for directed verdict, motion for judgment as a matter of law, or any other motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and permitting a ruling as matter of law, a claimant-- (A) demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact by offering evidence, which may be direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or some combination of the two, that is sufficient to allow a trier of fact to find that the defending party engaged in an unlawful conspiracy; (B) need not offer evidence tending to exclude the possibility that the defending party acted independently; and (C) need not demonstrate that the weight of the evidence favors the claimant, as all evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment and the weighing of the evidence is an issue for the finder of fact. (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to abridge or narrow the remedies available under the antitrust laws. <all>
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