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[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4697 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4697
To provide for design and safety requirements for autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 8, 2026
Mr. Schiff introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide for design and safety requirements for autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Human Authority in Lethal Operations
Act of 2026'' or the ``HALO Act of 2026''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(2) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial
intelligence'' has the meaning given such term in section 5002
of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020
(15 U.S.C. 9401).
(3) Autonomous weapon system.--
(A) In general.--The term ``autonomous weapon
system'' means a weapon system that, once activated,
can identify, select, or engage targets without further
intervention by or communication with a human operator.
(B) Includes.--The term defined in subparagraph (A)
includes weapon systems that have human-operated
supervision with the ability to override complete
operation of the system, but can select and engage
targets without further human operator input,
recalibration, or communication after activation.
(4) Covered artificial intelligence capability.--The term
``covered artificial intelligence capability'' means an
artificial intelligence designed, tested, developed, procured,
deployed, or used by, on behalf of, or shared with the
Department.
(5) Designated commander.--The term ``designated
commander'' means the highest ranking commissioned officer
within the chain of command who exercises operational or
administrative command authority over an autonomous or semi-
autonomous weapons system.
(6) Department.--The term ``Department'' means Department
of Defense.
(7) Ethical principles for artificial intelligence.--The
term ``Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence'' means
the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence adopted by
the Department on February 24, 2020, as in effect on January 1,
2025.
(8) Military departments.--The term ``military
departments'' has the meaning given such term in section 101(a)
of title 10, United States Code.
(9) Responsible artificial intelligence strategy and
implementation pathway.--The term ``Responsible Artificial
Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway'' means the
Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation
Pathway dated June 2022 and prepared by the Department of
Defense Responsible Artificial Intelligence Working Council in
accordance with the memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of
Defense Kathleen Hicks on May 26, 2021, Implementing
Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of
Defense, as in effect on January 1, 2025.
(10) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Defense.
(11) Semi-autonomous weapon system.--
(A) In general.--The term ``semi-autonomous weapon
system'' means a weapon system that, once activated, is
intended to only engage individual targets or specific
target groups that have been previously selected by a
human operator.
(B) Included.--The term defined in subparagraph (A)
includes weapon systems that autonomously conduct
engagement-related functions, including the following:
(i) Acquiring, tracking, and identifying
potential targets.
(ii) Cuing potential targets to human
operators.
(iii) Prioritizing selected targets.
(iv) Providing input on timing of when to
fire.
(v) Providing terminal guidance on how to
narrowly categorize selected targets, only if
human operator control is retained for the
purpose of selecting individual targets and
specific target groups for engagement.
(12) Specific target group.--
(A) In general.--The term ``specific target group''
means a discrete group of potential targets, such as a
particular flight of enemy aircraft, a particular
formation of enemy tanks, or a particular flotilla of
enemy vessels.
(B) Excluded.--The term defined in subparagraph (A)
does not include a general class of targets or a
specific type of target, such as a particular model of
tank or aircraft.
(13) Unintended engagement.--The term ``unintended
engagement'' means the use of force outcomes resulting in
damage to persons or objects that human operators did not
intend to be the targets of United States military operations,
including levels of collateral damage beyond those consistent
with the Law of Armed Conflict and relevant laws of the United
States and international laws, applicable rules of engagement,
and commander's intent.
SEC. 3. DESIGN AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTONOMOUS AND SEMI-
AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS.
(a) General Requirement.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall, acting through each
of the Secretaries of the military departments, ensure that
whenever the Department designs, tests, develops, procures,
deploys, or uses a system described in paragraph (2), the
system meets the requirements of this section.
(2) Systems.--A system described in this paragraph is an
autonomous weapon system or semi-autonomous weapon system that
uses artificial intelligence to create, generate, prioritize,
recommend, or engage targets or courses of action in support of
use of force decisions.
(b) Human Responsibility Over Use of Force.--
(1) Accountable individuals.--For each system described in
subsection (a)(2)--
(A) not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall promulgate
rules for clear chain of command and command hierarchy
for military operations involving a system described in
subsection (a)(2) to mirror the chain of command and
command hierarchy for military operations that do not
involve such systems;
(B) the Secretary shall ensure that a designated
commander is identified as accountable under applicable
military and international laws for each engagement or
class of engagements involving a system described in
subsection (a)(2), regardless of the degree to which
artificial intelligence contributed to the
identification, development, recommendation, selection,
or engagement of the target; and
(C) the designated commander identified under
subparagraph (B) shall exercise ultimate discretion,
judgment, and control over the use of force.
(2) System requirements.--Each system described in
subsection (a)(2) shall incorporate the following:
(A) A system design that incorporates capabilities
and interfaces that require the designated commander to
exercise ultimate discretion, judgment and control in
the envisioned development, planning, deployment, and
use processes for the weapon system, including
constraints on each such system's authorized actions,
targets, and geographic, temporal, and contextual
scope, which the system may not expand or modify
without explicit human authorization.
(B) System capabilities, human-machine interfaces,
doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and human
operator training must require commanders and human
operators to use the system with deference to their
discretion regarding care, and to analyze the output,
in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict and
relevant laws of the United States and international
laws, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules,
and rules of engagement that are applicable or
reasonably expected to be applicable.
(C) The creation and ongoing maintenance of records
of target selection data, decision logic, and human
operator actions, including the individual designated
under subsection (b)(1)(B), sufficiently detailed to
enable post-engagement review of compliance.
(D) The design, testing, development, procurement,
deployment, legal analysis and review, and use of
artificial intelligence capabilities in autonomous and
semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be consistent
with, but not limited to, the Ethical Principles for
Artificial Intelligence and the Responsible Artificial
Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway.
(3) Availability to the public.--The Secretary shall ensure
that--
(A) the Ethical Principles for Artificial
Intelligence and the Responsible Artificial
Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway are
available to the public; and
(B) any revision to the Ethical Principles for
Artificial Intelligence or the Responsible Artificial
Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway
adopted by the Secretary is made available to the
public before the date that is 30 days before the date
on which the revision goes into effect.
(c) Engagement Constraints and Termination.--
(1) In general.--Each system described in subsection (a)(2)
shall be designed--
(A) to complete engagements within a designated
timeframe and designated geographic area and against a
designated set of potential targets, as well as other
relevant constraints, consistent with commander and
human operator intentions;
(B) to require independent review and analysis of a
designated commander before using force against
previously unauthorized targets, materially expanding
target sets or geographic scope, taking actions
contravening applicable law, rules of engagement, other
relevant laws of the United States and international
laws, or taking actions likely to result in unintended
engagement; and
(C) if unable to complete an engagement consistent
with the parameters described in paragraph (1), to
terminate the engagement until additional human
operator and commander evaluation is completed.
(2) Evaluation criteria.--The evaluation criteria used
under subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) shall consist of
assessment of deficiencies and recommendations for changes to
be compliant with subparagraph (A) of such paragraph before
restarting preparation for engagement.
(d) Transparency, Auditability, and Explainability.--Consistent
with the potential consequences of an unintended engagement or
unauthorized interference with the operation of a system described in
subsection (a)(2), the physical hardware and software of such system
shall be designed with--
(1) technologies and data sources that are available to,
auditable by, and explainable to the greatest extent possible
by relevant personnel of the Department with the necessary
clearance level; and
(2) system safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, and
cybersecurity in accordance with Department instructions and
military standards governing cybersecurity and system safety.
(e) Activation, Termination, and Human Operator Interface.--Each
system described in subsection (a)(2) shall be designed so that--
(1) system design and human-machine interfaces are readily
understandable to trained human operators, including by clearly
disaggregating which actions human operators need to perform
and which actions the weapon system will perform;
(2) clear procedures exist for trained human operators to
activate, terminate, and disable all weapon system functions;
(3) the system provides timely feedback on system status,
including regarding the quality and sufficiency of the data
inputs relied upon, to human operators in real time or near-
real time; and
(4) adequate training, tactics, techniques, procedures, and
doctrine are available, reviewed on a quarterly basis, by
weapon system human operators and designated commanders to
understand the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of
the system's autonomy in realistic operational conditions.
(f) Degraded Communications Safeguard.--Any autonomous or semi-
autonomous weapon system that is, or is part of, an unmanned platform
shall be designed such that, in the event of degraded or lost
communications, the system does not autonomously select and engage
individual targets, specific target groups, or general classes or
specific types of targets that have not been previously selected by an
authorized human operator.
(g) Continuous Monitoring.--The Secretary shall, in coordination
with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and the appropriate
Secretary of a military department or Assistant Secretary for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, establish and maintain
procedures for continuous monitoring of each system, to the greatest
extent possible, described in subsection (a)(2) to identify and address
circumstances in which changes to the system design or operational
environment require additional testing and evaluation or legal review
to provide sufficient confidence that the system will continue--
(1) to function as intended;
(2) to avoid unintended engagements;
(3) to resist interference by unauthorized parties; and
(4) to remain compliant with relevant laws of the United
States, the Law of Armed Conflict, and international laws.
(h) Robust Artificial Intelligence Design.--For any system
described in subsection (a) that incorporates artificial intelligence
capabilities, such system shall be designed to utilize robust
artificial intelligence, in accordance with the Responsible Artificial
Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway so that the system is
resilient in real-world settings and against adversarial attacks and
spoofing.
SEC. 4. ADVANCED REVIEW AND APPROVAL AUTHORITY.
(a) General Requirement for Advanced Review.--With the exception of
systems described in subsection (e), the Secretary shall ensure that
each system described in section 3(a)(2) is approved in accordance with
this section before formal development and before fielding.
(b) Pre-Development Review.--Before a decision to enter formal
development of a system described in subsection (a), the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff shall jointly verify that--
(1) the weapon system design incorporates the necessary
capabilities to allow a designated commander to exercise
ultimate discretion, judgment, and control over the use of
force in the envisioned planning, deployment, and use processes
for the weapon;
(2) the system is designed to complete engagements within a
designated timeframe and designated geographic area and against
a designated set of potential targets, as well as other
applicable parameters, consistent with designated commander
intentions, and if unable to do so, to terminate use until
additional human operator and commander evaluation is completed
before continuing the engagement;
(3) the combination of the system's design and concept of
use, including its target selection and engagement logic,
accounts for risks of armed conflict, including to civilians,
civilian populations, civilian objects, and other protected
entities, consistent with commander and human operator intent
and obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict, or other
relevant laws of the United States and international laws;
(4) the system design, including system safety, anti-tamper
mechanisms, and cybersecurity, addresses and minimizes the
probability and consequences of failures;
(5) plans are in place for verification and validation and
test and evaluation to establish system reliability,
effectiveness, predictability of effects, and accuracy under
realistic conditions, including possible adversary actions,
interference, or unintended consequences;
(6) for systems incorporating artificial intelligence
capabilities, plans are in place to ensure consistency with the
Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and the
Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation
Pathway; and
(7) a thorough legal analysis, review, and risk assessment
of a system described in subsection (a) has been completed in
coordination with the General Counsel of the Department and
other relevant Department General Counsels and in accordance
with applicable directives governing the Defense Acquisition
System, the Department of Defense Law of War Program, the Law
of Armed Conflict, and other relevant laws of the United States
and international laws.
(c) Pre-Fielding Review.--Before fielding a system described in
subsection (a), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly verify that--
(1) system capabilities, human-machine interfaces,
doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and training have
been demonstrated to allow a designated commander to exercise
ultimate discretion, control, and judgment over the use of
force and to use systems whose outcomes are sufficiently
accurate with thorough legal analysis in accordance with the
law of war, Law of Armed Conflict, applicable treaties, weapon
system safety rules, and rules of engagement reasonably
expected to be applicable;
(2) system safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, cyber
survivability, operational resilience, and cybersecurity
capabilities have been implemented to minimize the probability
and consequences of failures, including unpredictable outcomes,
and a monitoring protocol is in place to identify and address
changes in operational environment, data inputs, and use that
could contribute to such failures;
(3) verification and validation and test and evaluation
have--
(A) assessed system performance, capability,
reliability, risk margins, effectiveness, and
suitability under realistic conditions, including
possible adversary actions, interference, or unintended
consequences; and
(B) have demonstrated that the system can be
revised as needed with sufficient rapidity to enable
timely correction of any unintended system behaviors
that may be observed or discovered during future system
operations;
(4) adequate training, tactics, techniques, procedures, and
doctrine are available, quarterly reviewed, and used by system
operators and commanders to understand the functioning,
capabilities, and limitations of the system in real world
conditions;
(5) system design and human-machine interfaces are readily
understandable to trained human operators, provide transparent
feedback on system status, provide secure logging to enable
traceability, and provide clear procedures for trained human
operators to activate and terminate system functions;
(6) for systems incorporating artificial intelligence
capabilities, the deployment and use of such capabilities in
the weapon system will be consistent with the Ethical
Principles for Artificial Intelligence, the Responsible
Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway,
the Law of Armed Conflict, and other relevant laws of the
United States and international laws; and
(7) a legal review of the compliance of the weapon system
with the Defense Acquisition System, the Department of Defense
Law of War Program, the Law of Armed Conflict, and other
relevant laws of the United States and international laws has
been completed in coordination with the General Counsel of the
Department.
(d) Re-Review of Modified Systems.--A system described in
subsection (a) that is a variant of an existing weapon system
previously approved through the review process under this section shall
not be covered by previous approval if changes to the system
algorithms, intended mission set, intended operational environments,
intended target sets, or expected adversarial countermeasures
materially differ from those applicable to the previously approved
weapon system. Such systems shall require a new analysis, review, and
risk assessment before formal development and again before fielding.
(e) Systems Not Requiring Advanced Review.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
advance review described in this section is not required for
weapon systems intended to be used in the following manners:
(A) Semi-autonomous weapon systems used to apply
lethal or non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic, force
without capability to function as an autonomous weapon
system.
(B) Human operator-supervised autonomous weapon
systems used to select and engage materiel targets for
local defense to intercept attempted time-critical or
saturation attacks for--
(i) static defense of installations with
personnel, including networked defense where
the autonomous weapon system is not co-located
with the installation; or
(ii) onboard or networked defense of
platforms with onboard personnel.
(C) Human operator-supervised autonomous weapon
systems used to select and engage materiel targets for
purpose of protecting remotely piloted or autonomous
vehicles and vessels.
(D) Autonomous weapon systems used to apply non-
lethal, non-kinetic force against materiel targets.
(2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a weapon
system intended to be used in the manner described in
subparagraph (B) of such paragraph in a case in which the
engagement zone for the system encompasses densely populated
areas or essential civilian infrastructure. In such a case, the
weapon system shall undergo the advanced review described in
this section to certify that the system can effectively
distinguish between military targets and non-combatants or
civilian objects in high-clutter environments.
SEC. 5. ROLE OF THE CHIEF DIGITAL AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.
(a) Monitoring and Evaluation.--The Chief Digital and Artificial
Intelligence Officer shall monitor and evaluate artificial intelligence
capabilities in, and cybersecurity for, autonomous and semi-autonomous
weapon systems, and shall advise the Secretary on such matters.
(b) Testable Requirements.--The Chief Digital and Artificial
Intelligence Officer shall, in collaboration with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering--
(1) formulate concrete, testable requirements for
implementing the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence
and the Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and
Implementation Pathway;
(2) establish policy and issue guidance on definitions of
requirements and testability for artificial intelligence-
enabled systems to implement and demonstrate adherence to the
Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and the
Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation
Pathway; and
(3) issue guidance on test and evaluation practices for
artificial intelligence capabilities in autonomous or semi-
autonomous weapon systems, which shall include an adversarial
assessment (known as ``red-team assessment'') that evaluates
weapon system vulnerability to adversarial manipulation under
operationally realistic conditions.
(c) Common Tools and Infrastructure.--The Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officer shall coordinate with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation on developing and using common tools
and infrastructure for test and evaluation and verification and
validation of artificial intelligence capabilities in autonomous or
semi-autonomous weapon systems, including assurance benchmarks for
reliability, robustness, security, and human-machine team performance.
SEC. 6. TESTING AND EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS.
(a) General Requirement.--The Secretary shall ensure that,
regardless of the acquisition pathway or testing and evaluation
oversight status for a weapon system, each system described in section
3(a)(2) undergoes--
(1) rigorous hardware and software verification and
validation; and
(2) realistic system developmental and operational test and
evaluation, including analysis of unanticipated emergent
behavior.
(b) Specific Considerations.--Testing and evaluation of a system
under subsection (a)(2) may include testing on how human operators
respond to ensure they are provided with enough time to exercise
judgment and can reject or challenge suggestions or recommendations.
(c) Specific Requirements.--Testing and evaluation of a system
under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) Verification that the system functions as anticipated
in realistic operational environments against adaptive
adversaries, including with realistic civilian presence,
activities, actions, and reactions, and are sufficiently robust
to minimize failures.
(2) For a system incorporating artificial intelligence
capabilities, rigorous developmental and operational test and
evaluation to verify and validate that the artificial
intelligence is robust according to design requirements.
(3) Testing to confirm that autonomy algorithms in systems
incorporating artificial intelligence capabilities can be
rapidly reprogrammed on new input data.
(d) Post-Fielding Testing.--The Secretary shall ensure that, after
initial operational test and evaluation of a system under subsection
(a), as directed by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation--
(1) system data is collected and any further changes to the
system undergo appropriate verification and validation and test
and evaluation to ensure that critical safety features have not
been degraded;
(2) system software is tested using best-available
Department means and methods to validate that critical safety
features have not been degraded, and automated testing tools,
such as modeling and simulation, are used whenever feasible;
(3) any new or revised operating states or other relevant
changes in the system are identified and undergoes appropriate
and tailored additional test and evaluation to characterize the
system behavior in that new operating state; and
(4) changes to the state transition matrix are evaluated to
determine whether they require whole system follow-on
operational test and evaluation.
(e) Iterative Cyber Testing.--The Secretary shall ensure that
hardware and software verification and validation of a system under
subsection (a) includes quarterly cyber test and evaluation to verify
that the system is resilient and survivable in contested cyberspace.
(f) Role of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.--Under
this section, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation shall--
(1) oversee development of realistic operational test, risk
assessments, and evaluation standards for autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems, including requirements for data
collection and standards for test and evaluation of any changes
to the system following initial operational test and
evaluation;
(2) evaluate whether autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon
systems under the Director's oversight have met standards after
being tested for rigorous verification, validation, and
evaluation in realistic operational conditions, including
potential adversary action, to ensure that the system is robust
to minimize failures;
(3) establish standards for data collection post-fielding
and monitoring and assessment by programs;
(4) establish and maintain a centralized repository for
reporting, collecting, and analyzing operational incidents,
weapon system failures, and unintended weapon system behaviors;
(5) review and approve operational and live fire test plans
for autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems; and
(6) coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering and the appropriate Secretary of a
military department or Assistant Secretary for Low-Intensity
Conflict to provide for monitoring to identify and address when
changes to the system design or operational environment require
additional testing and evaluation to ensure that the system is
robust to minimize failures such as unintended engagements with
civilians and civilian infrastructure, densely populated areas,
and resist interference by unauthorized parties.
SEC. 7. PROHIBITED USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) General Prohibition.--No covered artificial intelligence
capability may be used in any manner that violates the Constitution of
the United States, Federal law, the Law of Armed Conflict, or
international treaty or other legal obligation of the United States, or
in any manner that poses an unacceptable level of risk to the safety of
an individual or the civil liberty of an individual.
(b) Specific Prohibitions.--
(1) In general.--No covered artificial intelligence
capability may be used with the intent, purpose, or outcome
of--
(A) profiling, targeting, tracking, monitoring,
inferring, or concluding based on the data points of
activity of any individual based solely on the exercise
of rights protected under the Constitution or Federal
law, including freedom of expression, association, and
assembly;
(B) detecting, measuring, or inferring the
emotional state of any individual from data acquired
about such individual, including the support of the
health of consenting personnel of the Federal
Government;
(C) inferring or determining an individual's
religion, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation,
immigration status, disability status, gender identity,
or political identity;
(D) tracking, monitoring, or inferring the past,
real-time, or anticipated future location of any
individual in the United States, including using data
acquired from commercial, data brokers, data
aggregators, or other third-party sources, unless such
acquisition and use is authorized pursuant to an
individualized judicial order, warrant, or otherwise
required by the Constitution or Federal law;
(E) aggregating or analyzing internal data or data
acquired from commercial, data brokers, data
aggregators, or other third-party sources, including
but not limited to location data, financial transaction
data, communications metadata, or biometric data, to
accomplish any purpose prohibited under paragraphs (1)
through (4);
(F) removing a human from the chain of
decisionmaking for actions critical to informing and
executing decisions by the President, including
initiating or terminating nuclear weapons employment;
or
(G) obtaining, receiving, or otherwise accessing,
for a fee or other consideration, any personal data of
a United States person from a data broker or other
third-party source, including any other governmental
entity (including State, local, or Federal entities) if
such data was obtained by that entity in a manner that
would violate this subsection if performed by the
Department.
(2) Personal data.--For purposes of paragraph (1)(G), the
term ``personal data''--
(A) means data, derived data, or any unique
identifier that is linked to, or is reasonably linkable
to, an individual or to an electronic device that is
linked to, or is reasonably linkable to, one or more
individuals in a household;
(B) includes anonymized data that, if combined with
other data, can be linked to, or is reasonably linkable
to, an individual or to an electronic device that
identifies, is linked to, or is reasonably linkable to
one or more individuals in a household; and
(C) does not include data that is lawfully
available through Federal, State, or local government
records or through widely distributed media.
(c) Applicability.--The prohibitions in this section shall apply to
all activities of the Department, including operational planning,
logistics, intelligence analysis, and operational support to any other
agencies or military personnel, regardless of status of deployment. In
any case in which the Department shares systems, data, or analytical
products derived from a covered artificial intelligence capability or
protected data (as described in subsection (b)(7)) with another
department or agency of the Federal Government, the receiving
department or agency shall be subject to the same prohibitions and
requirements as the Department with respect to the use, querying, or
further dissemination of such systems, data, or products. The Secretary
shall ensure that such department or agency is notified of, and in
compliance with, the restrictions under this section.
(d) Joint Operations.--The prohibitions of this section shall apply
to any Departmental participation in joint task forces, fusion centers,
or interagency working groups, regardless of which agency serves as the
lead or providing entity.
SEC. 8. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS.
(a) Protections.--The Secretary shall update such whistleblower
protections as the Secretary considers appropriate to clarify
procedures for artificial intelligence systems, which shall ensure that
all personnel who develop, assess, deploy, operate, or use artificial
intelligence as a component of a National Security System (as defined
in section 3552(b) of title 44, United States Code) or otherwise for
military or intelligence purposes can report concerns about artificial
intelligence, including concerns about improperly harming civil
liberties, privacy, safety, or compliance with the requirements of this
Act, to relevant oversight officials.
(b) Compliance With Existing Law.--Updates to whistleblower
protections under subsection (a) shall be compliant with--
(1) section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, and its
implementation guidance under Department of Defense Directive
7050.06 (relating to military whistleblower protection);
(2) section 2302 of title 5, United States Code;
(3) title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act of
Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-126; 128 Stat. 1414) and the
amendments made by such title; and
(4) section 4701 of title 10, United States Code.
(c) Anonymity.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall ensure that adequate
and special procedures exist to receive, investigate, respond
to, and redress complaints anonymously, when appropriate, and
that reports may be made confidentially so that personnel may
raise concerns without fear of reprisal for any disclosures
related to artificial intelligence.
(2) Exception.--Confidentiality under paragraph (1) shall
not extend to significant misconduct, including violations of
law or government ethics, or when otherwise precluded by law.
(d) Investigation and Corrective Action.--The Secretary shall
ensure that adequate and special procedures exist for reporting
incidents of artificial intelligence misuse, investigations of reported
incidents, and processes for taking corrective actions.
SEC. 9. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Semiannual Report on Artificial Intelligence Use Cases.--Not
later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
semiannually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report containing the following:
(1) A description of exemplary use cases of artificial
intelligence within the Department during the preceding year,
identifying best practices, failure modes, and risk mitigation
strategies employed.
(2) After-action reports on significant operational use of
covered artificial intelligence capabilities during the
preceding year, including--
(A) an assessment of system performance and
effectiveness of human oversight;
(B) any identified risks or failure modes;
(C) a detailed accounting of any critical
incidents, including incidents resulting in civilian
casualties or injuries, damage to civilian objects or
protected infrastructure, or other unintended effects
inconsistent with the Law of Armed Conflict; and
(D) recommendations for improvements to human
oversight, system safeguards, and the mitigation of
future civilian harm.
(3) A description of training provided to human operators
of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems and other
artificial intelligence capabilities covered by this Act,
including documentation on employment procedures and
responsible retirement of systems.
(b) Annual Report on Infrastructure and Barriers.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report identifying--
(1) any significant barriers to the responsible development
and deployment of artificial intelligence within the
Department;
(2) gaps in infrastructure required to support
traceability, auditability, risk analysis, and forensics for
artificial intelligence capabilities covered by this Act; and
(3) recommended hardware, software, or other infrastructure
needs necessary to fulfill the requirements of this Act.
(c) Semiannual Report on Compliance for Fielded Systems.--Not later
than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
semiannually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report identifying--
(1) each fielded system for which compliance under this Act
cannot be certified, with a description of the specific
requirement or requirements with which the system does not
comply;
(2) the operational or national security legal
justification, if any, for the continued fielding of each such
non-compliant system; and
(3) a remediation plan and timeline for bringing each such
system into compliance or, if compliance is not practicable, a
plan for the responsible retirement or modification of the
system.
SEC. 10. EXCEPTIONS.
(a) Cyberspace Capabilities.--The requirements of sections 3, 4, 5,
and 7 shall not apply to autonomous or semi-autonomous cyberspace
capabilities.
(b) Unarmed Platforms.--The requirements of sections 3, 4, 5, and 7
shall not apply to unarmed platforms, whether remotely operated or
operated by onboard personnel, and whether autonomous or semi-
autonomous.
(c) Time-Critical Defensive Systems.--In cases where the time
available between threat detection and required intercept is
insufficient to allow for individual human authorization of each
engagement and provided that such operations do not have death or
serious bodily harm to any person as a reasonably foreseeable
consequence, the requirements of sections 3, 4, 5, and 7 shall not
apply to--
(1) systems employed exclusively for the defense against
incoming munitions, rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles; or
(2) unmanned aircraft systems.
(d) Other Excluded Systems.--The requirements of sections 3, 4, 5,
and 7 shall not apply to--
(1) unguided munitions;
(2) munitions manually guided by the human operator, such
as laser- or wire-guided munitions;
(3) mines;
(4) unexploded explosive ordnance; or
(5) autonomous or semi-autonomous systems that are not
weapon systems.
(e) Identification Systems.--The requirements of sections 3, 4, 5,
and 7 shall not apply to a system described in section 3(a)(2) with the
sole purpose and outcome of identifying potential targets without
further intervention by or communication with a human operator.
SEC. 11. EFFECTIVE DATE; REVIEW OF SYSTEMS CURRENTLY IN USE.
(a) In General.--This Act shall take effect on the date that is 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Review of Systems Currently in Use.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
effective date set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary shall
conduct a review of all systems described in section 3(a)(2)
that are in use by the Department as of such effective date.
(2) Attestation.--Upon completion of the review required
under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a written attestation
identifying, for each reviewed system, whether the system is
compliant with the requirements of sections 3, 6, and 7.
(3) Noncompliant systems.--For any system that the
Secretary cannot attest is in compliance with sections 3, 6,
and 7, the Secretary shall immediately cease all use of such
system and, concurrent with the attestation required under
paragraph (2), submit to appropriate committees of Congress a
remediation plan that includes--
(A) a description of the specific requirement or
requirements with which the system does not comply;
(B) an operational or national security
justification, if any, for continued use of the system
pending remediation; and
(C) a timeline for bringing the system into
compliance or, if compliance is not practicable, for
the responsible retirement or modification of the
system.
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