SenateS. 5160119th Congress
Countering Gray-zone Aggression by the People’s Republic of China Act
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[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 5160 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 5160
To require the Secretary of State and relevant executive branch
agencies to monitor and address gray-zone operations of the People's
Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific, to hold accountable gray-zone
activities by national and international actors, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
July 29, 2026
Ms. Duckworth (for herself and Mrs. Blackburn) introduced the following
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require the Secretary of State and relevant executive branch
agencies to monitor and address gray-zone operations of the People's
Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific, to hold accountable gray-zone
activities by national and international actors, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Countering Gray-zone Aggression by
the People's Republic of China Act''.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) gray-zone operations employed in the Indo-Pacific
region with the purpose of expanding Chinese interest via
coercion by the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a growing
threat to the United States, national security, regional
partners in the Indo-Pacific and economic interests globally,
with the Indo-Pacific region and Taiwan being a vital area of
interest to the United States;
(2) gray-zone tactics are employed by the PRC with the
specific purpose of reunification with Taiwan through slow
erosion of political cohesion, economic independence and
societal confidence without kinetic escalation, among other
objectives;
(3) gray-zone tactics are becoming increasingly prevalent
in the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific region with the
increased incursions of Chinese vessels in national waters,
airspace incursions, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and
economic coercion, in which Taiwan and the Philippines are
identified as main targets;
(4) the PRC is continuously increasing the scope of targets
and disputed territories in the Pacific, broadening the list of
target territories beyond Taiwan and the Philippines;
(5) PRC-Russia gray-zone tactic coordination is becoming an
increasing security risk for the United States in both the
Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific, with the involvement of Chinese
vessels in cable breakages in Europe, and Russian vessels near
Taiwan;
(6) the United States Indo-Pacific allies and partners find
themselves at the forefront of aggression by the PRC, which
they cannot effectively counter without substantive
intelligence sharing, coordination, and publicization of PRC
aggression, which can be further supplemented by United States
coordination;
(7) the United States Government should redouble efforts to
hold the PRC accountable, including partnering with non-
governmental groups who are documenting and exposing the PRC's
coercive and destabilizing activities, for the purpose of
deterrence; and
(8) to effectively address PRC use of gray-zone tactics,
the United States Government should work with partner
governments, civil society experts, and private stakeholders to
improve information sharing, strengthen preventative measures,
raise public awareness, and increase coordination on regional
law enforcement.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
(a) In General.--In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives;
(2) Gray-zone tactics.--The term ``gray-zone tactics''
means the use of activities, short of open warfare, to advance
a state's interests by maximizing advancement while avoiding
kinetic military responses, including a mix of diplomatic,
economic, informational and paramilitary tools.
(3) Strategy.--The term ``Strategy'' means the strategy to
monitor and counter gray-zone tactics and hold the PRC
accountable required under section 4.
(b) Rule of Construction.--The definitions under this section are
exclusive to this Act and may not be construed to affect any other
provision of United States law.
SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE AND ENACT THE MONITORING OF CHINESE GRAY-
ZONE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the
Attorney General, the heads of intelligence community agencies, and the
heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy (in this
section referred to as the ``Strategy'') that--
(1) is designed to monitor and make public gray-zone
tactics used by the PRC to the detriment of our allies and
partners, as a means of exposing PRC methods and limiting their
damage;
(2) consults with the intelligence community on best
practices of increasing intelligence sharing;
(3) is global in scope; and
(4) may prioritize efforts focused on the PRC activities in
the Indo-Pacific region and the Taiwan Strait.
(b) Contents.--The Strategy shall--
(1) provide an assessment of gaps in capabilities or
resourcing regarding our ability to monitor PRC gray zone
activities in the Indo-Pacific;
(2) outline a list of territories or areas currently
impacted by or imminently vulnerable to PRC gray-zone
operations with an assessment the capabilities of United States
allies and partners to respond, and describe the status of
efforts to engage with these partners at governmental and local
levels;
(3) identify all active, relevant United States foreign
assistance programs and diplomatic efforts underway to mitigate
and counter gray-zone tactics;
(4) identify, if applicable, any additional capabilities or
resources inherent to allies and partners, the private sector,
or academia that would enhance the response to PRC gray-zone
activities;
(5) outline additional resources or authorities needed to
adequately counter PRC gray-zone activities and any obstacles
to responding to gray-zone tactic incidents;
(6) outline an action plan for how the Federal Government
will monitor, prevent, and deter PRC gray-zone activities,
including in coordination with allies and partners, including
strategic efforts to raise awareness and public exposure of PRC
gray-zone activities; and
(7) establish objectives and performance indicators to
achieve this strategy.
(c) Limitation.--Nothing in the Strategy may affect, apply to, or
create obligations related to past, present, or future criminal or
civil law enforcement or intelligence activities of the United States
or the law enforcement activities of any State or subdivision of a
State.
(d) Classification.--The Strategy shall be unclassified but may
include a classified annex.
SEC. 5. ESTABLISHING A TASK FORCE TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after submitting the
Strategy pursuant to section 4(a), the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury,
and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall
establish an interagency task force (referred to in this section as the
``Task Force'')--
(1) to coordinate the implementation of the Strategy;
(2) to conduct and enhance regular monitoring and analysis
of gray-zone operations internationally;
(3) to track, formulate and strengthen tools for the
purpose of countering and mitigating gray-zone operations
internationally, including determining and reporting funding
requirements;
(4) to track and evaluate progress toward the objectives,
activities, and performance indicators of the Strategy
described in section 4(b)(5); and
(5) to update the Strategy, in consultation with the
appropriate congressional committees, as needed.
(b) Annual Reviews and Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the
establishment of the Task Force, and not less frequently than annually
thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the heads of other
Federal departments and agencies, shall--
(1) conduct a status review of the Strategy and the overall
state gray-zone operations by the PRC in the Indo-Pacific;
(2) include a list of impacted allies and partners, as well
as actors who may be enabling the PRC's gray zone activity in
the Indo-Pacific; and
(3) submit the results of such review in a public report to
the appropriate congressional committees, which may contain a
classified annex.
(c) Task Force Termination.--The Task Force shall terminate on the
date that is 7 years after the date on which it is established.
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