Text of Senate Amendment 6116

On 2026-06-24, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) delivered a floor speech titled "Text Of Senate Amendment 6116" in the Senate.

Text of Senate Amendment 6116

Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 106 (Wednesday, June 24, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 106 (Wednesday, June 24, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S3321-S3325] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6116. Mr. PAUL submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SEC. ___. RISKY RESEARCH REVIEW ACT. (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Risky Research Review Act''. (b) Life Sciences Research Security Board.--Subtitle V of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``CHAPTER 79--LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH SECURITY BOARD ``7901. Definitions. ``7902. Establishment and membership. ``7903. Board personnel. ``7904. Board mission and functions. ``7905. Agency procedures; referral to Board. ``7906. Board review. ``7907. GAO Audits. ``7908. Funding. ``Sec. 7901. Definitions ``In this chapter: ``(1) Agency.--The term `agency' has the meaning given the term in section 552(f) of title 5. ``(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term `appropriate congressional committees' means the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. ``(3) Board.--The term `Board' means the Life Sciences Research Security Board established under section 7902(a). ``(4) Dual use research of concern.--The term `dual use research of concern'-- ``(A) means life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could-- ``(i) be misapplied to do harm with no modification or only a minor modification; and ``(ii) pose a significant threat with potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, materiel, or national security; and ``(B) includes-- ``(i) life sciences research that could-- ``(I) increase transmissibility of a pathogen within or between host species; ``(II) increase the virulence of a pathogen or convey virulence to a non-pathogen; ``(III) increase the toxicity of a known toxin or produce a novel toxin; ``(IV) increase-- ``(aa) the stability of a pathogen or toxin in the environment; or ``(bb) the ability to disseminate a pathogen or toxin; ``(V) alter the host range or tropism of a pathogen or toxin; ``(VI) decrease the ability for a human or veterinary pathogen or toxin to be detected using standard diagnostic or analytical methods; ``(VII) increase resistance of a pathogen or toxin to clinical or veterinary prophylactic or therapeutic interventions; ``(VIII) alter a human or veterinary pathogen or toxin to disrupt the effectiveness of pre-existing immunity, via immunization or natural infection, against the pathogen or toxin; ``(IX) enhance the susceptibility of a host population to a pathogen or toxin; ``(X) enhance transmissibility of a pathogen in humans; ``(XI) enhance the virulence of a pathogen in humans; ``(XII) enhance the immune evasion of a pathogen in humans, such as by modifying the pathogen to disrupt the effectiveness of pre-existing immunity via immunization or natural infection; or ``(XIII) generate, use, reconstitute, or transfer an eradicated or extinct high-consequence pathogen; and ``(ii) any other category of life sciences research that the Board, by majority vote of the members of the Board, identifies and publishes in the Federal Register. ``(5) Employee.--The term `employee' means an individual described in section 2105(a) of title 5. ``(6) Federal funding.--The term `Federal funding' means amounts awarded by an agency pursuant to an intramural or extramural grant, cooperative agreement, interagency agreement, contract, or other instrument. ``(7) Gain of function research.--The term `gain of function research' means a research experiment that may enhance the transmissibility or virulence of a high- consequence pathogen. ``(8) High-consequence pathogen.--The term `high- consequence pathogen'-- ``(A) means a wild-type or synthetic pathogen that-- ``(i)(I) is likely capable of wide and uncontrollable spread in human populations; and ``(II) would likely cause moderate to severe disease or mortality in humans; or ``(ii) is-- ``(I) subject to subparagraph (B), influenza A virus; ``(II) classified under subgenus Sarbecovirus; ``(III) classified under subgenus Merbecovirus; ``(IV) Variola orthopoxvirus; ``(V) Mpox orthopoxvirus; ``(VI) Nipah henipavirus; ``(VII) Hendra henipavirus; ``(VIII) Ebola orthoebolavirus; ``(IX) Marburg marburgvirus; ``(X) Lassa mammarenavirus; ``(XI) Junin arenavirus; ``(XII) Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever orthonairovirus; ``(XIII) Hantaan orthohantavirus; ``(XIV) Sin Nombre orthohantavirus; ``(XV) Yersinia pestis; ``(XVI) a select agent or toxin, work with which poses a significant risk of deliberate misuse; ``(XVII) any other pathogen or category of pathogen that a majority of members of the Board-- ``(aa) identifies as a high-consequence pathogen; and ``(bb) publishes in the Federal Register; or ``(XVIII) any synthetic construct of a pathogen or category of pathogen described in this clause; and ``(B) does not include a seasonal influenza virus, unless a seasonal influenza virus has been manipulated to include genetic sequences from a pathogen described in subparagraph (A). ``(9) High-risk life sciences research.--The term `high- risk life sciences research' means life sciences research that is-- ``(A) dual use research of concern involving a high- consequence pathogen; or ``(B) gain of function research. ``(10) Life sciences research.--The term `life sciences research'-- ``(A) means the study or use of a living organism, a virus, or a product of a living organism or virus; and ``(B) includes each discipline, methodology, and application of biology, including biotechnology, genomics, proteomics, bioinformatics, and pharmaceutical and biomedical research and techniques. ``(11) Select agent or toxin.--The term `select agent or toxin' means a select agent or toxin identified under-- ``(A) section 73.3(b) of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on the date of enactment of the Risky Research Review Act; ``(B) section 331.3(b) of title 7, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on the date of enactment of the Risky Research Review Act; or ``(C) section 121.3(b) of title 9, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on the date of enactment of the Risky Research Review Act. ``Sec. 7902. Establishment and membership ``(a) Establishment.--There is established as an independent agency within the Executive Branch a board to be known as the `Life Sciences Research Security Board' to review proposed Federal funding for life sciences research in accordance with section 7906. ``(b) Appointment of Members.-- ``(1) In general.--The President shall appoint, without regard to political affiliation, 9 individuals who are citizens of the United States to serve as members of the Board for not more than 2 terms of 4 years each, including-- ``(A) the Executive Director appointed under section 7903(a); ``(B) 5 nongovernmental scientists in a life sciences field; ``(C) 2 nongovernmental national security experts; and ``(D) 1 nongovernmental biosafety expert. ``(2) Period for nominations.--The President shall make appointments, other than the Executive Director, to the Board not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this chapter. ``(3) Considerations of recommendations.--The President shall make appointments to the Board after considering individuals recommended by the chair and ranking member of the appropriate congressional committees. ``(4) Qualifications.--Individuals appointed to the Board-- ``(A) shall-- ``(i) be impartial individuals; and [[Page S3322]] ``(ii) be distinguished individuals of high national professional reputation in their respective fields who are capable of exercising the independent and objective judgment necessary to conduct an impartial assessment of the potential risks and benefits associated with Federal funding of high- risk life sciences research to public health and national security; and ``(B) may not be an employee on the date of the appointment or during the 3-year period preceding the date of the appointment. ``(5) Limitations.--Not more than 4 concurrent members of the Board may be an employee, a subcontractor, a previous employee, or a previous subcontractor of-- ``(A) the Department of Defense; ``(B) the Department of Homeland Security; ``(C) the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the Department of Health and Human Services; ``(D) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; or ``(E) the Department of Energy. ``(6) Consideration by the senate.-- ``(A) In general.--Nominations for appointment to the Executive Director of the Board shall be referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate for consideration. ``(B) Renomination.--A member of the Board who is recommended to serve a second term shall be nominated for appointment to the Board, and such nomination shall be referred pursuant to subparagraph (A). ``(7) Vacancy.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which a vacancy on the Board occurs, the vacancy shall be filled in the same manner as specified for the original appointment. ``(8) Removal.-- ``(A) In general.--No member of the Board shall be removed from office, other than by-- ``(i) impeachment and conviction; ``(ii) the action of the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, physical disability, men