FASTER LABOR CONTRACTS ACT

On 2026-06-15, Representative Tim Walberg (R-MI-5) delivered a floor speech titled "FASTER LABOR CONTRACTS ACT" in the House.

FASTER LABOR CONTRACTS ACT

Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 100 (Monday, June 15, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 100 (Monday, June 15, 2026)] [Extensions of Remarks] [Pages E573-E576] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] FASTER LABOR CONTRACTS ACT ______ speech of HON. TIM WALBERG of michigan in the house of representatives Tuesday, June 9, 2026 Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the following letters from Alex McDonald and Roger King, in opposition to H.R. 5408. Re Opposition to the Faster Labor Contracts Act--H.R. 5408 June 9, 2026. Hon. Tim Walberg, Chairman, House Committee on Education and Workforce, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Walberg: We are writing regarding H.R. 5408, the Faster Labor Contracts Act (``FLCA''). The FLCA is a deeply flawed piece of legislation that should not be considered by this Congress--or any other. It aims to speed up negotiations for first collective-bargaining agreements between employers and workers. The bill's authors evidently believe that those negotiations take too long. But while negotiations are long, they are long for a reason: negotiating a first contract is hard. It involves detailed financial and operational tradeoffs, which the parties must negotiate from ground zero. So it is no surprise that contracts often take weeks, months, or years to finalize. That ``delay'' is not a sign that the process is broken; it is a sign that the process is working. Worse, the bill proposes to solve that problem with a deeply flawed approach. It would funnel the parties through a compressed bargaining schedule, terminating in compulsory and binding arbitration. Parties would have only 90 days to negotiate their own agreements, after which the bill's processes would kick in. Those processes would be exceptionally burdensome and expensive, requiring complex and cost-heavy hearings to ``prove'' what a ``fair'' contract would be. America's businesses cannot afford that burden, and Congress should not force them to swallow it. If that weren't enough, the bill is likely unconstitutional. It would raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause, the Vesting Clauses, and the Appointments Clause. It would also threaten to convert every collective- bargaining agreement imposed under its procedures into ``state action,'' dragging constitutional doctrines into the American workplace. These problems have not been considered, much less vetted. The bill needs serious rework, and members should not vote for it if they take seriously their oath to uphold the Constitution. Yet despite these problems, some members are pushing the legislation through with an unusual procedure--the discharge petition. That procedure is inappropriate in most cases and especially inappropriate here. This bill is deeply problematic and needs the scrutiny of ordinary legislative processes. It should not be rammed through with extraordinary procedural maneuvers. We urge you and the other members of Congress to reject the discharge petition and reject this bill. As you are aware, the House will be considering H.R. 5408 as a result of a discharge petition signed by certain Members that requires the House to consider and schedule a vote on this legislation without the benefit of Committee deliberation. This discharge protocol and procedure is not the preferred method to consider legislation. It precludes meaningful input from all stakeholders who are potentially impacted by the legislation in question. H.R. 5408 has not had the benefit of any meaningful Member or staff analysis. No hearings have been held on this legislation. No opportunity has been provided for stakeholders to file comments and submit questions regarding the legislation. More troubling, no technical analysis has been undertaken regarding the legislation. And that analysis is badly needed, as this legislation is technically defective in several respects and is not in proper form to be considered by the House of Representatives. No financial or cost analysis has been undertaken. No Committee markup has occurred regarding this legislation. This legislation should be referred back to the House Education and Workforce Committee (``Committee'') to permit Members and all stakeholders to consider counterproposals, amendments, appropriate background research information, and academic studies regarding the impact of this legislation. We urge you and your colleagues to have H.R. 5408 returned to the Committee. Proponents of H.R. 5408 assert that there is a significant problem with the time period it takes parties to reach an agreement on an initial collective bargaining agreement. They allege that employers are largely responsible for delays, and such delays in the negotiation process are designed to undermine union representation. They further allege that such delay strategies are often part of employers' plans to decertify or remove a union. There is no reliable data to support these arguments and allegations. First, it is very difficult to ascertain the start date of collective bargaining in negotiations, especially for first contracts, where the parties may not have any prior relationship. Does the start date of negotiations begin when one party sends another party a request for information and documents?--a procedure often used by unions to prepare for negotiations. Does the negotiation start date begin when the parties start general discussions about the issues to be discussed in negotiations? Does a preliminary discussion regarding whether the parties should conclude non-economic issues before moving to economic issues start the negotiation process? Do mutually agreed upon delay periods in [[Page E574]] negotiations--which often occur--count toward the average time it takes for first contracts to be completed? When does the negotiation period end? Does it end when a tentative agreement is reached or when any tentative agreement is ultimately ratified by bargaining unit members? What if a tentative agreement is reached between a union and an employer, but the bargaining unit rejects it? Does the subsequent period after such a tentative agreement is reached count toward the average negotiation period for initial contracts? Further, how should legitimate litigation initiatives be counted under the days it takes to negotiate an initial contract? A union or an employer may have good faith reasons to contest a decision of the National Labor Relations Board (``NLRB'' or ``Board'') regarding the categories of employees that the Board included or excluded from the bargaining unit. Well-established federal labor law permits unions and employers to appeal decisions through the federal court of appeals--test of certification cases. Such appeal periods can, at a minimum, take months if not over a year depending on if a circuit-worthy appeal is filed. Additionally, what if a union legitimately believes it needs certain information from an employer before it can sufficiently bargain or conclude bargaining? For example, information regarding the cost of certain employer-provided health benefits and limits of coverage of any employer policy could be information that the union believes is necessary to make proposal in the health insurance area. Should the period it takes the NLRB to resolve any dispute of the scope of the information request be included in calculating the time period to negotiate an initial collective bargaining agreement? There are many other examples that could be listed and should be analyzed and considered in calculating the number of days that it takes parties to negotiate labor contracts. Absent a comprehensive and thorough analysis of the details of hundreds of initial collective bargaining negotiations over an extended period of time, there can be no meaningful or reliable data to support any conclusions about the average time it takes parties to negotiate such agreements. Even if thoughtful or comprehensive studies could be conducted to determine the average time it takes parties to reach an initial collective bargaining agreement--which has not been done to date--the results of any studies, in all probability, would show it takes a substantial amount of time to reach initial labor contract agreements. Such an analysis may very well show that it takes in excess of over four hundred days (400) on average to reach an agreement. Members of Congress need to understand that this is a complex process. Labor contracts often contain many articles and, in some cases, are over one hundred (100) pages. These initial agreements also often contain appendices, memoranda of understanding, and ``side letters.'' These agreements, especially from the union perspective, attempt to cover virtually all of an employee's relationship with their employers. The bottom line is that bargaining these contracts takes time--considerable time. The importance of carefully and thoughtfully negotiating first contracts and their terms cannot be emphasized enough. Such negotiations are critical for employees, unions, and employers. There are good reasons that it takes time to negotiate initial collective bargaining agreements. The parties are not just negotiating over wages. They are constructing a comprehensive workplace contractual framework, including work schedule details, health and retirement benefits, paid time off and holidays, discipline standards, grievance and arbitration procedures, and dozens of other topics critical to employees and employers. These negotiations can be time-consuming because the results of such negotiations and the contents of an initial collective bargaining agreement are critical for the union to continue as a representative for employees and for the employer to continue its business operations. Additionally, there are other reasons that may explain that a significant amount of time is needed to negotiate initial collective bargaining agreements. For example, either unions or employers ma

Referenced legislation: HR5408