Text of Senate Amendment 6170

On 2026-06-24, Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) delivered a floor speech titled "Text Of Senate Amendment 6170" in the Senate.

Text of Senate Amendment 6170

Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 106 (Wednesday, June 24, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 106 (Wednesday, June 24, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S3358-S3365] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6170. Mrs. SHAHEEN (for herself, Mr. Young, Ms. Cortez Masto, Mr. Rounds, Ms. Slotkin, Mr. Justice, and Mr. King) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of division A, add the following: TITLE XVII--SECURE MINERALS SEC. 1701. SHORT TITLE. This title may be cited as the ``Securing Essential and Critical U.S. Resources and Elements Minerals Act of 2026'' or the ``SECURE Minerals Act of 2026''. SEC. 1702. FINDINGS. Congress finds that-- (1) critical minerals and materials are essential to the ongoing economic and national security of the United States, playing a vital role in the manufacturing, transportation, medical, technology, defense, and energy sectors; (2) the global demand for critical minerals and materials has been rapidly increasing due to advancements in technology, whether defense, dual-use, or commercial, and the increasing adoption of renewable energy sources and next- generation automotive systems, all of which rely heavily on critical minerals and materials for the production of batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, high-speed computing, advanced magnetic systems, and other high-tech applications; (3) the People's Republic of China-- (A) currently controls a significant portion of the global supply chain for critical minerals and materials through extensive mining, integrated midstream operations, significant domestic subsidies and incentives, and strategic investments in resource-rich countries, dominating the global market infrastructure for critical minerals and materials and enhancing the ability of the People's Republic of China to manipulate pricing to the detriment of competitors; (B) centrally controls its dominant market share across multiple critical mineral vertical markets, preventing fair competition and hindering the ability of United States firms and firms in partner countries to innovate and scale production; (C) predatorily leverages its position as sponsor or consumer, as applicable, over mining projects globally, resulting in a dearth of feedstocks to the great detriment of downstream industries, regions, and countries, including the United States; (D) operates integrated supply chains that are subservient to the Chinese state and are calibrated to weaponize influence over prices and volumes in the contest for access to critical minerals and materials, as well as the end-use components and applications produced from critical minerals and materials; and (E) acts to undercut efforts in the United States and partner countries to develop alternative sources of supply; (4) producers of critical minerals and materials in the United States often face artificially low prices set by supply chains controlled by the People's Republic of China, discouraging private investment in domestic extraction and processing; (5) the lack of transparent, competitive, and market-driven pricing mechanisms for critical minerals and materials outside of the People's Republic of China compounds market problems, creating systemic risk and limiting the viability of an independent supply chain for critical minerals and materials in the United States; (6) the United States is heavily reliant on imports for many of the most critical minerals and materials, including rare earth elements, making the United States vulnerable to supply disruptions, geopolitical tensions, and economic manipulation by countries that dominate the market, specifically the People's Republic of China; (7) the vulnerabilities to the United States defense industrial base posed by reliance on imports of critical minerals and materials are significant, and given the long lead times for investments in both mining and processing of critical minerals, domestic critical [[Page S3359]] minerals production projects are particularly susceptible to price shocks induced by the People's Republic of China, which can depress critical mineral prices for an extended period; (8) increasing domestic primary feedstock production, processing, conversion, recycling, reuse, and repurposing to advanced materials and products, as well as increasing alternative market supply in partner countries, are imperative to reduce the impact of market manipulation by foreign state actors, such as the People's Republic of China; (9) the United States must ensure that a stable and secure supply chain of essential resources is available to our domestic innovation and manufacturing ecosystems; (10) sustainable and responsible corporate behavior in the direct operations of companies and across their global value chains is important to ensuring a resilient domestic critical minerals supply; (11) investments in domestic extraction and processing infrastructure, as well as reuse, repurposing, and recycling, are necessary to build a resilient and diversified supply chain for critical minerals and materials, supporting the economic growth and national security interests of the United States; and (12) government support to develop and ensure the integrity of Western and partner country markets for critical minerals and materials as a countermeasure against the anti- competitive tactics of the People's Republic of China and the supply chain co-collaborators of the People's Republic of China will fill the most acute strategic gap, which cannot be otherwise achieved by private industry participants acting alone. SEC. 1703. DEFINITIONS. In this title: (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate; (B) the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives; (C) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; (D) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; (E) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; (F) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; (G) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; (H) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; (I) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; (J) the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives; (K) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (L) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. (2) Authorized intermediary.--The term ``authorized intermediary'' means an entity that-- (A) is a private entity; (B) has expertise in more than 1 critical mineral or material; (C) has expertise in commodities trading, market making, capital management, or finance; (D) does not have any management influenced by a foreign entity of concern or a citizen of a covered country, including any entities affiliated with the private entity or the ownership of the private entity; (E) is not owned, controlled, directed, financed, or otherwise influenced, directly or indirectly, in whole or in any part greater than 25 percent, by a foreign entity of concern, a citizen of a covered country, or the government of a covered country; and (F) has been approved to be an authorized intermediary by the Board. (3) Board.--The term ``Board'' means the board of governors of the Reserve established by section 1705(a). (4) Chairperson.--The term ``Chairperson'' means the Chairperson of the Board. (5) Covered country.--The term ``covered country'' means a country that-- (A) is a covered nation (as defined in section 4872(f) of title 10, United States Code); or (B) the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence, determines to be engaged in conduct that is detrimental to the national security or foreign policy of the United States. (6) Critical mineral or material.--The term ``critical mineral or material'' means mineral or material included in the list of eligible critical minerals and materials established by the Reserve under section 1708(a). (7) Dependence rate.--The term ``dependence rate'' means the percentage of domestic end-use consumption of a critical mineral or material that is supplied by production by a foreign entity of concern or in a covered country, in aggregate. (8) Foreign entity of concern.--The term ``foreign entity of concern'' means a foreign entity that-- (A) meets the requirements described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (D), or (E) of section 10638(3) of the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act (42 U.S.C. 19237(3)); or (B)(i) is owned, controlled, directed, financed, or otherwise influenced, directly or indirectly, in whole or in any part greater than 25 percent, by the government of a foreign country that is a covered country; or (ii) is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a government of a covered country; (9) Indirect financial interest.-- (A) In general.--The term ``indirect financial interest'', with respect to a person, means a financial interest-- (i) that is not directly held by that person; and (ii) from which that person benefits. (B) Benefits.--For the purposes of subparagraph (A)(ii), in addition to any other benefit, a person shall be considered to benefit from a financial interest if the financial interest is held by-- (i) a spouse, child, or dependent of that person; or (ii) a close family member or other individual having a close relationship with, and residing in the home