Text of Senate Amendment 6683

On 2026-07-14, Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) delivered a floor speech titled "Text Of Senate Amendment 6683" in the Senate.

Text of Senate Amendment 6683

Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 114 (Tuesday, July 14, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 114 (Tuesday, July 14, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S3953-S3956] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6683. Mr. COTTON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, [[Page S3954]] and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of title X, add the following: Subtitle H--Chip Security Act SEC. 1094. SHORT TITLE. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Chip Security Act''. SEC. 1095. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) technology developed in the United States should serve as the foundation for the global ecosystem of artificial intelligence to advance the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States and allies and partners of the United States; (2) the United States can foster goodwill, strengthen relationships, and support innovative research around the world by providing allies and partners of the United States with advanced computing capabilities; (3) advanced integrated circuits and computing hardware that are exported from the United States must be protected from diversion, theft, and other unauthorized use or exploitation in order to bolster the competitiveness of the United States and protect the national security of the United States; (4) illegal diversion of advanced integrated circuits and computing hardware, particularly illegal diversion to the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, is a significant and growing issue that undermines the United States' export controls and threatens the United States' national security; (5) implementing chip security mechanisms will improve enforcement of export control laws of the United States, assist allies and partners with guarding computing hardware, and enhance protections from bad actors looking to access, divert, or tamper with advanced integrated circuits and computing hardware; and (6) implementing chip security mechanisms may help with the detection of smuggling or exploitation of advanced integrated circuits and computing hardware, thereby allowing for increased flexibility in export controls and opening the door for more international partners to receive streamlined and larger shipments of advanced computing hardware. SEC. 1096. DEFINITIONS. In this subtitle: (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. (2) Chip security mechanism.--The term ``chip security mechanism'' means, with respect to a covered integrated circuit product, a software-, firmware-, or hardware-enabled security mechanism or a physical security mechanism, including-- (A) periodic on-site audits or inventories at the end- user's approved destination for the covered integrated circuit product; (B) periodic attestations by a U.S.-headquartered entity, or its subsidiaries, confirming that all covered integrated circuit products are accounted for, provided the Under Secretary approves the attestations; (C) except in the case of a covered integrated circuit product whose sole or principal function is memory or storage, ping-based location verification through a trusted landmark server utilizing secure software- or firmware- enabled mechanisms; or (D) various other mechanisms, or combinations of mechanisms, that the Under Secretary determines can verifiably demonstrate with significant confidence that the covered integrated circuit product has not been illegally diverted to a destination of concern. (3) Covered integrated circuit product.-- (A) In general.--The term ``covered integrated circuit product'' means a certain integrated circuit, computer, or other product classified under Export Control Classification Number 3A090, 4A090, 5A002.z, related .z Export Control Classification Numbers, or other functionally equivalent or substantially similar items. (B) Modification.--The Under Secretary shall routinely modify the definition of the term ``covered integrated circuit product'' under subparagraph (A) for the purposes of this subtitle to ensure only integrated circuits, computers, electronic assembly, or components designed or marketed for datacenter use are subject to the requirements of this subtitle. (C) Exclusion.--The term ``covered integrated circuit'' does not include-- (i) covered integrated circuits or products containing a covered integrated circuit that are not designed or marketed for use in a data center; (ii) microprocessor microcircuits, such as central processing units, that are not graphics processing units or similar products; or (iii) network switch integrated circuits whose dominant function is routing traffic over a computing network. (4) Destination of concern.--The term ``destination of concern'' means-- (A) a country subject to a United States arms embargo as described in section 126.1 of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations; or (B) any other country determined by the Under Secretary. (5) Export, in-country transfer, and reexport.--The terms ``export'', ``in-country transfer'', and ``reexport'' have the meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801). (6) Under secretary.--The term ``Under Secretary'' means the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security. SEC. 1097. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. Nothing in this subtitle may be construed to direct the Under Secretary-- (1) to require any chip security mechanisms that-- (A) may hinder the capability or functionality of a covered integrated circuit product, such as a kill switch or geofencing mechanism; or (B) meaningfully undermine the cybersecurity of the covered integrated circuit product; (2) to mandate the incorporation of a location verification mechanism on a covered integrated circuit product that requires physical changes to hardware; (3) to consider any chip security mechanism requirements of this subtitle as applicable to a person that fabricates covered integrated circuit products, unless the person also designs the respective covered integrated circuit products; (4) to require chip security mechanisms for exports of integrated circuits, computers, electronic assemblies, or components that are not designed or marketed for artificial intelligence datacenter use; (5) to limit any other enforcement authority of the Under Secretary or the head of any other Federal department or agency under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.) or any other provision of law; or (6) to apply any requirements or regulations under this subtitle to any covered integrated circuit products in the United States. SEC. 1098. INITIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHIP SECURITY MECHANISMS. (a) Assessment.--On the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy and in robust consultation with the public in a manner determined appropriate by the Under Secretary and in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall initiate an assessment-- (1) to identify potential chip security mechanisms to enable reliable verification of whether a covered integrated circuit product has been illegally diverted or accessed; (2) to develop incentives for facilitating industry-wide incorporation of such chip security mechanisms; (3) to conduct an analysis of the potential costs associated with implementing such chip security mechanisms; and (4) to recommend a set of chip security mechanisms that would effectively detect diversion and smuggling and is technically feasible, cost-effective, and ensures the technology leadership of the United States. (b) Stakeholder Engagement.--In carrying out the requirements under subsection (a), the Under Secretary shall undertake a robust stakeholder engagement process to inform the development and implementation of chip security mechanisms, which shall include-- (1) soliciting input from relevant stakeholders, including-- (A) private sector entities involved in the covered integrated circuit product supply chain; (B) experts in software, firmware, hardware security, cybersecurity, privacy, export compliance, national security, and advanced artificial intelligence; and (C) individuals from academic institutions, federally funded research and development centers, Federal departments and agencies, and other research organizations with relevant expertise; and (2) incorporating stakeholder feedback to ensure that required chip security mechanisms are operationally effective, scalable, and aligned with best practices in security, privacy, and export compliance. (c) Report to Congress.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 210 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the assessment required by subsection (a), including-- (A) an identification of the chip security mechanisms the Under Secretary plans to propose pursuant to implementing section 1099; (B) an identification of future research and development directions that could be used to enhance robustness of chip security mechanisms and incentives to promote such research and development directions; (C) a roadmap for the timely implementation of the chip security mechanisms; and (D) any recommendations for potential modifications to relevant export controls to allow for more flexibility with respect to the countries to or in which co