Text of Senate Amendment 6639

On 2026-07-13, Senator John Barrasso (R-WY) delivered a floor speech titled "Text Of Senate Amendment 6639" in the Senate.

Text of Senate Amendment 6639

Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S3836-S3840] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6639. Mr. BARRASSO (for himself and Mrs. Shaheen) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place in title XII, insert the following: Subtitle __--Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026 SEC. __1. SHORT TITLE. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026''. SEC. __2. DEFINITIONS. In this subtitle: (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code. (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (3) Appropriate federal agencies.--The term ``appropriate Federal agencies'' means the following: (A) The Department of Commerce. (B) The Department of Defense. (C) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (D) The Department of State. (E) The Federal Communications Commission. (F) The Department of the Treasury. (G) The Department of Justice. (H) Any additional Federal agencies, as determined by the President. (4) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical undersea infrastructure'' refers to both subsea communications infrastructure and subsea energy infrastructure. (5) Interagency committee.--The term ``interagency committee'' means the entity established under section __1(b). (6) Non-federal entity.--The term ``non-Federal entity'' means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual, organization, or business involved in the operation, maintenance, repair, or construction of critical undersea infrastructure, including critical undersea infrastructure owners. [[Page S3837]] (7) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means any act, or attempt to commit such an act, undertaken with the intent to cause damage to, or substantial interruption or impairment of, the safe and reliable operation of, critical undersea infrastructure, including by materially degrading the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of data transmitted via subsea communications infrastructure. (8) Subsea energy infrastructure.--The term ``subsea energy infrastructure'' means a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, including-- (A) to transmit electricity, including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations; (B) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure; and (C) associated landing stations and facilities. (9) Subsea communications infrastructure.--The term ``subsea communications infrastructure'' has the same meaning as ``submarine cable system'', as defined in section 1.70001(h) of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, and any subsequent update to such meaning. PART I--INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. __1. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a growing threat to United States and allied security and economic prosperity. (2) In recent years, numerous critical undersea infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including-- (A) in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea communications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, home of SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite ground station on Earth; (B) in February 2023, the reported damage to subsea communications infrastructure connecting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait; (C) in October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to- Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline spanning the Gulf of Finland, in addition to the reported damage to subsea communications cables connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia; (D) in November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland- to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea communications cables and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea communications cable in the central Baltic Sea; (E) in December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland- to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea communications cables in the Gulf of Finland; (F) in January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans- Pacific Express subsea communications cable connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan; (G) in February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea communications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait; (H) in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea communications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea linking Liepaja and Sventoji; and (I) in January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel named the Fitburg. (3) In February 2024, NATO Defense Ministers established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to coordinate information and threat intelligence sharing among private and public sector actors to protect critical undersea infrastructure. (4) In January 2025, following critical undersea infrastructure sabotage in the Baltic Sea in December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched Baltic Sentry to strengthen the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. (5) On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development and deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated surveillance approach. (6) The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to ``build a secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable network'' and ``to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair, maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine cables, between ASEAN Member States''. (7) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners. Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific region. SEC. __2. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) critical undersea infrastructure represents vital strategic and economic links between the United States and its partners and allies; (2) according to NATO, ``undersea cables carry an estimated $10 trillion in transfers every day; two-thirds of the world's oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported by sea; and around 95 percent of global data flows are transmitted via undersea cables''; (3) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea infrastructure, especially across Northern Europe and East Asia; (4) private sector owners and operators of critical undersea infrastructure are responsible for the installation, maintenance, security, and repair of critical undersea infrastructure, and the role of the United States Government is to support, not supplant, those responsibilities through domestic and international coordination, including with the private sector and allied foreign governments, to improve security, threat detection, and incident response to address sabotage and policies that undermine critical undersea infrastructure resilience; (5) the United States Government has an important role to play in supporting international bodies concerned with the protection of critical undersea infrastructure, including promoting network resilience and redundancy, and encouraging the implementation of appropriate standards and best practices in support of these goals; (6) the United States Government should deepen its contribution to multilateral efforts to protect critical undersea infrastructure, including appropriate participation in NATO initiatives such as the NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, allied maritime security efforts such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, Indo- Pacific initiatives, including the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, and international organizations such as the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), in order to advance United States national security and economic interests; and (7) the United States shoul