AIRSPACE LOCATION AND ENHANCED RISK TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2026

On 2026-04-14, Representative André Carson (D-IN-7) delivered a floor speech titled "AIRSPACE LOCATION AND ENHANCED RISK TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2026" in the House. The speech addressed taxes and also covered the environment, defense. It referenced legislation: HR7613.

AIRSPACE LOCATION AND ENHANCED RISK TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2026

Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 65 (Tuesday, April 14, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 65 (Tuesday, April 14, 2026)] [House] [Pages H2856-H2874] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] {time} 1630 AIRSPACE LOCATION AND ENHANCED RISK TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2026 Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7613) to require certain aircraft to be equipped with collision mitigation technology, to improve helicopter route safety and separation around airports, to update air traffic control processes and procedures, to address national airspace system safety in Department of Defense activities, and for other purposes, as amended. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The text of the bill is as follows: H.R. 7613 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency Act of 2026'' or the ``ALERT Act''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Definitions. Sec. 3. Findings; sense of Congress. TITLE I--CIVIL AVIATION MATTERS Sec. 101. Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa inhibit altitude. Sec. 102. Airborne Collision Avoidance System upgrades. Sec. 103. Airborne collision avoidance systems for rotorcraft. Sec. 104. Collision prevention systems. Sec. 105. Prohibition on certain use of ADS-B data. Sec. 106. Rulemaking accountability. Sec. 107. Time-on-position limits. Sec. 108. Controller threat and error management training. Sec. 109. Controller visual separation training. Sec. 110. Safety risk assessment tool. Sec. 111. Operational rates at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. Sec. 112. Time-based flow management. Sec. 113. Air traffic control facility levels. Sec. 114. Working group to evaluate shared frequency around Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. Sec. 115. Anti-blocking technology. Sec. 116. Task force to identify improvements to air traffic controller conflict alert system. Sec. 117. Postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing. Sec. 118. Further modifications to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport area helicopter routes. Sec. 119. Requiring vertical separation near airports during critical phases of flight. Sec. 120. Helicopter Route Chart annual review. Sec. 121. Visual charts. Sec. 122. Close proximity encounters. Sec. 123. Notification of close proximity encounters and analysis of data. Sec. 124. Safety culture and safety management review. Sec. 125. Documentation of control position combinations. Sec. 126. Review of miles-in-trail procedures or agreements. Sec. 127. Closure of Helicopter Route 4. TITLE II--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MATTERS Sec. 201. Department of Defense matters relating to aviation safety. Sec. 202. Repeal of prior provision of law on manned rotary wing aircraft safety. Sec. 203. Treatment of superseded memorandum of agreement and provision of law. Sec. 204. Report on communications degradation. Sec. 205. Annual report on proficiency flights in National Capitol Region. Sec. 206. Briefing on virtual constructive training. Sec. 207. Transparency regarding midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport on January 29, 2025. SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) ADS-B in.--The term ``ADS-B In'' means technology that receives and processes Automatic Dependent Surveillance- Broadcast transmissions that are broadcast in accordance with part 91.225 and 91.227 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, and other aviation advisory information from ground stations, including traffic information service- broadcast (TIS-B) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance- Rebroadcast (ADS-R). (2) Administrator.--The term ``Administrator'' means the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. (3) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate. (4) Collision prevention technology.--The term ``collision prevention technology'' means equipment, or a combination of equipment, that-- (A) has ADS-B In; (B) uses ADS-B data to provide the pilot and flight crew with situational awareness of surrounding traffic and traffic advisories; and (C) provides, and is configured to provide, alerting that is audible to the pilot and flight crew. (5) FAA.--The term ``FAA'' means the Federal Aviation Administration. (6) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Transportation. SEC. 3. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS. (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) On January 29, 2025, about 8:48 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, a Sikorsky UH-60L operated by the United States Army under the callsign PAT25 (Priority Air Transport 25) and an MHI RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CRJ700 operated by PSA Airlines as American Airlines flight 5342, collided in flight about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, D.C. (2) The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers onboard the airplane and 3 crewmembers onboard the helicopter died. (3) This tragedy represents the deadliest aviation disaster in the United States since the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 in 2001 and the first fatal major commercial passenger flight accident in the United States since Colgan Air Flight 3407 in 2009. (4) Passengers aboard Flight 5342 included American citizens from across the country and international travelers, among them championship figure skaters and coaches returning from competition, military servicemembers, and families traveling for personal and professional reasons, each of whom is mourned by loved ones. [[Page H2857]] (5) Crewmembers aboard Flight 5342 served their passengers with professionalism and dedication and the three United States Army soldiers aboard Priority Air Transport 25 gave their lives in service to this Nation. (6) Emergency responders from Alexandria City Fire Department, Alexandria Police Department, Ann Arundel Fire Department, Arlington County Fire & Rescue, Arlington County Office of Emergency Management, Arlington Police Department, Baltimore City Fire Department, Baltimore Police, Charles County Fire and Rescue, DC Fire Department & EMS, DC Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax City Fire & Rescue, Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Department, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Maryland Natural Resources Police, Maryland State Police, Metropolitan Police Department, Montgomery County Fire and Rescue, Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) Fire & Rescue, MWAA Police, NCR-Incident Management Team, Office of Chief Medical Examiner of the District of Columbia, Prince George's County Fire & Rescue, Prince William Fire & Rescue, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving, Virginia Department of Emergency Management, Virginia State Police, and other local, state, and Federal agencies conducted heroic rescue and recovery operations in frigid, dangerous conditions--including near-freezing water temperatures and strong winds--working tirelessly to recover all 67 victims and reunite them with their loved ones. (7) The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) immediately launched a full investigation and, on March 7, 2025, issued urgent safety recommendations to prohibit operations on Helicopter Route 4 during simultaneous runway operations, which the Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration promptly implemented. (8) The NTSB held a public meeting on January 27, 2026, where the NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near DCA; as well as the air traffic system's overreliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept. (9) The NTSB determined that the lack of effective pilot- applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, the tower team's loss of situation awareness and degraded performance due to the high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real-time operational risk factors, and the Army's failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of error tolerances on barometric altimeters in their helicopters, were also causal to the collision. (10) The NTSB further determined that contributing factors included the limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crews; an unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix, and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strained the DCA air traffic control tower workforce and degraded safety over time; the Army's lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, DC, helicopter routes; the FAA's failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including Automatic Dependent Surveillance- Broadcast In, and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational chan

Referenced legislation: HR7613, HR7613