MONITOR ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

On 2026-05-14, Representative Jamie Raskin (D-MD-8) delivered a floor speech titled "MONITOR ACCOUNTABILITY ACT" in the House.

MONITOR ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 82 (Thursday, May 14, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 82 (Thursday, May 14, 2026)] [House] [Pages H3480-H3486] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] MONITOR ACCOUNTABILITY ACT Mr. BIGGS of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1275, I call up the bill (H.R. 8365) to provide for conditions on the appointment of monitors by courts, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1275, the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on the Judiciary, printed in the bill, modified by the amendment printed in part A of House Report 119-648, is adopted and the bill, as amended, is considered read. The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows: H.R. 8365 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Monitor Accountability Act''. SEC. 2. CONDITIONS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF MONITORS BY COURTS. (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this section, the Judicial Conference of the United States shall by rule establish conditions on the appointment by a district court of the United States of any person charged, pursuant to a court order, with monitoring the conduct of a State or unit of local government. Such conditions shall include the following: (1) Fees.--Such person-- (A) may not assess a fee in excess of such maximum rates as the Judicial Conference of the United States may establish; and (B) shall be authorized to employ the use of pro bono time or reduced rates. (2) Exclusivity and term.--Such person may not be-- (A) appointed to more than one such monitorship at a time; (B) appointed for a term greater than 5 years; or (C) reappointed after the expiration of such term pursuant to the same court order. (3) Subsequent monitors.--A monitor who is appointed to a monitorship after the expiration of the term of a monitor who served pursuant to the same court order may not be employed by the same employer as the previous monitor. (4) Public comment.--Prior to the appointment of a monitor, the court shall provide notice of the person to be appointed and afford the public an opportunity for comment thereon. (5) Termination.-- (A) Revision.--In the case that a court, a party, or a monitor seeks to revise a monitorship imposed by a court order, the court shall conduct a hearing. (B) Scope of monitorship.--The court may only revise a requirement of a monitorship with respect to which the subject of the monitorship has not attained substantial and sustained compliance. (b) Transfer.--On the date that is 6 years after the court order imposing a monitorship, if such monitorship is in effect on such date, the case shall be transferred to another judge in the district in which the case is pending. (c) Accounting.-- (1) In general.--On an annual basis, a monitor shall submit to the court imposing the monitorship an accounting, which shall include-- (A) information on the services provided and the fee charged for such services; and (B) whether any such services were provided pro bono or at a reduced rate. (2) Publication.--The court shall make available to the public any accounting submitted to the court under paragraph (1). (d) Retroactivity.--In the case of a monitorship that is in effect on the date of enactment of this Act and has been in effect for 6 years-- (1) a new monitor shall be appointed not later than 180 days after such date of enactment in accordance with the limitations under this section; and (2) the case shall be transferred not later than 1 year after such date of enactment in accordance with this section. (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that monitoring is a public service and monitorships should be structured to encourage the use of pro bono time or reduced rates. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for 1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary or their respective designees. The gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Biggs) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Raskin) each will control 30 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona. General Leave Mr. BIGGS of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 8365. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arizona? There was no objection. Mr. BIGGS of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 8365 is the result of a field hearing that the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance held in February in Phoenix, Arizona. While that hearing focused on the special monitor in Maricopa County, it has implications for residents across the Nation who also find their law enforcement agencies held hostage by a special monitor or consent decree. Since December 2013, the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, MCSO, has been under a Federal judicial oversight following a DOJ intervention into the 2008 case of Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio. In 2007, Latino motorists and passengers, aided by the ACLU, filed a lawsuit against then-Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio. The lawsuit alleged that MCSO violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments by engaging in a systematic practice of unconstitutional racial profiling, including stopping, detaining, and arresting Latino individuals during traffic stops and patrol operations based on race or perceived immigration status. Following a bench trial in December 2011, U.S. District Judge Murray Snow ruled in 2013 that MCSO had violated constitutional protections and imposed permanent injunctions that required MCSO to implement sweeping reforms to policies, training, operations, and internal investigations. Unlike a consent decree, which is a negotiated settlement agreed to by the parties, the court imposed these injunctions after findings of liability. DOJ consent decrees are typically entered into voluntarily by State or local governments to resolve a civil rights investigation without a trial, even though they can result in similarly extensive Federal oversight and court-appointed monitoring. In January 2014, Judge Snow appointed Federal court monitor Robert Warshaw to oversee MCSO's compliance with the court's permanent injunctions, including reforms intended to address racial discrimination during traffic stops and deficiencies in policy development and oversight. Following that, in July 2015, the court mandated additional remedial measures, including further policy revisions to further strengthen oversight mechanisms. The Federal court monitoring was intended to last only until MCSO achieved full and effective compliance with the court's injunctions, yet oversight has continued for more than a decade without a fixed end date. This extended judicial supervision has placed significant financial burdens on Maricopa County taxpayers, with costs reportedly reaching nearly $350 million. {time} 1340 Most of these expenses include the administrative efforts needed to demonstrate compliance with court orders. [[Page H3481]] For example, despite remote work and meetings in 2021, the county was responsible for funding a 3,200-square-foot office suite for the monitor, which cost taxpayers $97,000 for a year. This persistent Federal judicial intervention has created operational challenges for MCSO, including difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified deputies. All of these things, by the way, are consistent with monitoring that is going on in most of the country. The increased administrative workload and ongoing scrutiny have led to a decline in staff retention and discouraged potential recruits from pursuing careers within the department, which is ultimately impacting the office's ability to serve and protect the community, one of the largest counties in the country, with over 5\1/2\ million people. The Federal court monitor typically issues quarterly reports tracking MCSO's compliance with the court-ordered reforms and provides the court with independent assessments of policy implementation. Over the course of more than 40 reports, MCSO's compliance rate increased from below 30 percent in 2014 to over 94 percent by 2025, which meets the standard that requires the agency to demonstrate adherence in more than 94 percent of instances under review. According to Warshaw, the MCSO's compliance framework has become self-sustaining and institutionalized. Warshaw also labeled the MCSO's compliance with policies, training, and supervisory review as solid, noting that the compliance measures were fully built into the agency's daily work, showing full, independent accountability. Earlier this year, the Department of Justice, which originally intervened in this case in 2011, filed a brief supporting Maricopa County's request to end Federal oversight, noting that the litigation has been successful in reforming the agency. By the way, we are on the fourth elected sheriff since this original complaint was filed. The Department argued that the extensive reforms imposed through the court-appointed monitoring regime have been successful in correcting the unconstitutional practices identified in the original case, which you will recall was the racial profiling of Latino motorists. DOJ cited multiple recent monitor reports, which document consistently high compliance rates, institutionalized policy adherence, effective training programs, and durable accountability mechanisms. The Department indicated that continued Federal supervision is no longer necessary to ensure constitutional policing, supporting termination of the court-

Referenced legislation: HRES1275, HRES1275, HR8365