Text of Senate Amendment 6703

On 2026-07-20, Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) delivered a floor speech titled "Text Of Senate Amendment 6703" in the Senate.

Text of Senate Amendment 6703

Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 118 (Monday, July 20, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 118 (Monday, July 20, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S4163-S4164] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6703. Mr. SCHUMER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of subtitle E of title X, add the following: SEC. 1049A. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE WITH RESPECT TO CYBER AND PHYSICAL THREATS TO THE ELECTRIC GRID. (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) The electric grid of the United States--the commercial electric power generation, transmission, and distribution system comprising power lines and other infrastructure-- delivers the electricity that is essential for modern life. As a result, the reliability of the electric grid, ability to meet the electricity demand of consumers at all times, is not a luxury. Such reliability is fundamental to the health and safety of the people of the United States and the continued strength of the economy of the United States, making the reliability of the electric grid a paramount issue of national interest. (2) The annual report on worldwide threats issued by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 108B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3043b) (commonly known as the ``Annual Threat Assessment'') has consistently found that state and non-state cyber actors pose the most significant threats to the critical infrastructure of the United States. (3) The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment found that foreign adversaries are intent on attacking ``critical infrastructure, disrupting utility company business networks or manipulating poorly secured control systems''. (4) The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment states that ``cyber actors from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and ransomware groups will continue to pose critical threats to U.S. networks and critical infrastructure''. (5) According to the annual report issued by U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, foreign adversaries, like the Chinese state-backed cyber actor Volt Typhoon, have infiltrated the power system of the United States to collect operational insights into the electric grid, identify chokepoints with outsized control over grid operations, and pre-position cyber assets for operational disruptions. (6) Components of the power system produced by the People's Republic of China, particularly internet-connected devices and advanced wireless communications equipment, and commercial satellite communications terminals create vulnerabilities for the electric grid. (7) Grid distribution systems increasingly use operational technology and industrial control systems that allow remote access via public and private advanced wireless networks for easier maintenance and more detailed data collection. (8) The fragmented nature of regulatory authority over the electric grid of the United States poses challenges to creating and implementing effective, uniform cybersecurity regulations. (9) The Government Accountability Office has warned that the electric grid of the United States is heavily reliant on space-based infrastructure, particularly Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), for the precise timing and synchronization of power flows. The disruption, degradation, or spoofing of such signals by foreign adversaries and the compromise of commercial satellite communications used for remote grid management, present critical vulnerabilities to the stability of the electric grid. (10) A study issued by the Comptroller General of the United States found that although the Department of Energy has developed plans and an assessment to implement a Federal strategy for addressing security risks to the electric grid, such efforts have fallen short because the Federal Government has not conducted a complete assessment of all the cybersecurity risks to the grid. (b) Requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a national intelligence estimate addressing the risks and national security implications of foreign adversaries targeting the electric grid of the United States with cyber and physical attacks. (c) Elements.--The national intelligence estimate required by subsection (b) shall include the following: (1) A comprehensive risk assessment of known cyber and physical security threats and vulnerabilities to the electric grid of the United States, including the risk posed by state- backed actors in the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and foreign non-state actors, such as ransomware groups. (2) An assessment of how varying lengths of electricity blackouts caused by cyber and physical attacks would impact-- (A) national security, including with respect to the loss of access to commercial internet and advanced wireless telecommunications; (B) satellite communications infrastructure used in security operations; and (C) the total economic activity, health, and other critical activities of the United States. (3) An assessment of the efficacy of policies to strengthen supply chain risk management requirements for the electric grid, including-- (A) identifying foreign-origin components within high- and medium-impact bulk electric system and protected cyber assets, including semiconductors, advanced wireless network equipment, satellite receiver systems, precision timing hardware, and other technology components; and (B) developing requirements to prohibit the installation of or mitigate the foreign cyber risk posed by such components. (4) An assessment of the efficacy of policies to support the adoption of nationwide cyber and physical security standards and tools to protect the electric grid from foreign state-backed cyber actors. (5) An assessment of the efficacy of policies to support the expansion of the electric grid in a safe and secure manner. (d) Submission to Congress.-- (1) Form.--The national intelligence estimate shall be submitted in classified form (2) Public availability.--Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the Director submits to the appropriate committees of Congress the national intelligence estimate under subsection (b), the Director shall make publicly available on an internet website of the intelligence community an unclassified version of the key findings of such national intelligence estimate. (e) Appropriate Committee of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committee of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. [[Page S4164]] ____________________