Floor SpeechBipartisan2026-06-15

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

TaxesClimateEnvironmentForeign PolicyDefenseChinaTradeHousingTechnologyInfrastructureAgriculture

Context

On 2026-06-15, Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) delivered a floor speech titled "STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS" in the Senate.

Full Text

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 100 (Monday, June 15, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 100 (Monday, June 15, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S2786-S2791] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS By Mr. SCHUMER (for himself, Mr. Reed, Ms. Klobuchar, Mr. Coons, Mr. Schatz, Ms. Warren, Mr. Booker, Mr. Van Hollen, Ms. Duckworth, Mr. Kelly, Mr. Kim, Ms. Blunt Rochester, and Ms. Alsobrooks): S. 4781. A bill to expand the mission of the Export-Import Bank of the United States and focus on building export-related domestic critical industries that produce goods and services that support employment in the United States and strengthen global competitiveness, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, the Make More in America Act--if we have learned anything from the past few years, it is that the American people will pay the price when wars, pandemics, and other shocks disrupt America's supply chains. Today, I led Senate Democrats in introducing the Make More in America Act, which will invest in American manufacturing to create jobs, lower costs, strengthen our national security, and build a more resilient economy. The Make More in America Act is going to help us face the challenges that China and other countries present, and we should move it as quickly as we can. If the United States is going to continue to outcompete China, we need to make sure that the technologies that will define the 21st- century economy are made in American factories by American workers. The U.S. Export-Import Bank has long helped American businesses stay competitive, and our bill will empower the Ex-Im Bank to provide even more support to building here at home the industries critical to our economy and our national security. From COVID-19 to Trump's disastrous war with Iran, to China weaponizing our reliance on them for certain products, America cannot afford to depend on the unreliable when the security and prosperity of our people are at stake. Our bill would rebuild American manufacturing, strengthen our supply chains to lower costs, and give us an edge over the Chinese Communist Party, all of which--all of which--should be bipartisan priorities. For the good of the country, we can and must make progress on these issues as we reauthorize the Export-Import Bank this year. Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: S. 4781 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Make More in America Act of 2026''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Findings. Sec. 3. Purposes. Sec. 4. Modification of powers and functions. Sec. 5. Make More in America Program. Sec. 6. Modification of aggregate loan, guarantee, and insurance authority. Sec. 7. Modification of default rate and lending cap. Sec. 8. Investment Committee. Sec. 9. Interagency coordination. Sec. 10. Limitation on eligibility for support. Sec. 11. Modification of Program on China and Transformational Exports. Sec. 12. Increase in goal for export of goods and services related to renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, and energy storage. Sec. 13. Employment authority. Sec. 14. Expansion of guarantee coverage. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The People's Republic of China poses a significant competitive threat to the United States, accounting, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, for 35 percent of manufacturing volume globally and 29 percent of [[Page S2787]] value-add (as opposed to 12 percent of volume and 16 percent of value-add for the United States). The People's Republic of China continues to gain ground in higher value-add technologies that were traditionally United States strengths. (2) The People's Republic of China's increased competitiveness can be traced to multiple sources, including coordinated initiatives such as Made in China 2025, which channeled resources toward manufacturing in higher value-add industries. However, the People's Republic of China also, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, leads in research and development in 66 of 74 areas. (3) Taken together, the two trends described in paragraphs (1) and (2) suggest that the People's Republic of China's lead in exports will grow, not shrink, unless serious action is taken by the United States to strengthen its domestic innovation and industrial investment. (4) This is especially true for critical industries of the future, such as next-generation automotives and drones, industrial automation, biotechnology, biomanufacturing, quantum technology, and fusion energy, unless the United States takes steps to support technology development in those markets. Many of those markets are, or could be, vital export opportunities with meaningful economic, national security, and job creation implications for the United States. (5) The United States also faces supply chain vulnerabilities in critical inputs for those industries of the future, including energy, semiconductors and associated technologies like circuit boards, critical minerals, batteries, and other technology components. (6) Capital-intensive industries with long production cycles, such as shipbuilding, chemical processing, and nuclear energy systems, face particularly acute financing challenges during the commercialization phase and the scaling of domestic production. Similarly, drone manufacturing and advanced robotics require coordinated investments in both production capacity and workforce training that private markets struggle to provide. The result is that countries with patient public capital, particularly the People's Republic of China, have captured dominant market positions in sectors where United States innovation initially led. (7) If the United States does not respond, manufacturers in the People's Republic of China will continue gaining global market share in critical technologies at the expense of United States companies and the United States stands to lose critical industries that provide jobs, create production capacity, and serve essential national security goals. (8) As such, Federal policy should focus on ensuring that technologies that are invented and developed in the United States are commercialized and produced in the United States, along with the products and services those technologies create. That will require a whole-of-government effort dedicated to revitalizing the ``innovation and industrial infrastructure'' of the United States. (9) While this is a multi-faceted issue that the Export- Import Bank of the United States (in this section referred to as the ``Bank'') cannot solve alone, the Bank can play a much more strategic role than the Bank is playing as of the date of the enactment of this Act by supporting the development phase of future technologies in areas that are underfunded by existing private sector tools. (10) The Bank has an opportunity to create the export markets of tomorrow by helping to fund the development, commercialization, and production of critical technologies in the United States, which will expand the long-term export base of the United States by increasing the overall competitive edge of the United States, and in doing so, support employment in the United States. (11) There exists an opportunity to enhance the Bank's strategic planning capabilities and deepen the Bank's focus on catalytic and scale-up financing. Such a repositioning would support technologies with substantial domestic manufacturing footprints in industries that represent not only strategic national security and competitiveness priorities but also significant employment opportunities across manufacturing communities in the United States. (12) Congress has already directed the Bank to undertake efforts in that direction, such as through the Program on China and Transformational Exports established under section 2(l) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (12 U.S.C. 635(l)), which explicitly requires 20 percent of the Bank's funds to be invested in certain areas deemed highly strategic, including artificial intelligence, biotechnology, renewable energy, semiconductors, quantum technology, and fusion energy, among other industries. A logical next step would be to expand that program to broaden its aperture and importance within the Bank, while reaffirming the Bank's mission to support export-related transactions that directly support United States jobs. (13) In 2022, the Bank's Board of Directors with a unanimous vote launched the Make More in America Initiative to support ``export-oriented domestic manufacturing projects'', extending some of the Bank's existing demand- driven, export-contingent financing programs to a more domestic focus to help revitalize United States manufacturing, directly support United States jobs, improve the resiliency of domestic supply chains, and level the playing field for United States companies competing in overseas markets. (14) There is an opportunity for the Bank to play a convening role in developing a cohesive investment roadmap for the Bank's own mandate, informed by input from across the Federal Government, including the industrial investment efforts of other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, and the Small Business Administration. SEC. 3. PURPOSES. The purposes of th

Referenced legislation: S4781, S4781

View original source →

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 100 (Monday, June 15, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 100 (Monday, June 15, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S2786-S2791] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS By Mr. SCHUMER (for himself, Mr. Reed, Ms. Klobuchar, Mr. Coons, Mr. Schatz, Ms. Warren, Mr. Booker, Mr. Van Hollen, Ms. Duckworth, Mr. Kelly, Mr. Kim, Ms. Blunt Rochester, and Ms. Alsobrooks): S. 4781. A bill to expand the mission of the Export-Import Bank of the United States and focus on building export-related domestic critical industries that produce goods and services that support employment in the United States and strengthen global competitiveness, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, the Make More in America Act--if we have learned anything from the past few years, it is that the American people will pay the price when wars, pandemics, and other shocks disrupt America's supply chains. Today, I led Senate Democrats in introducing the Make More in America Act, which will invest in American manufacturing to create jobs, lower costs, strengthen our national security, and build a more resilient economy. The Make More in America Act is going to help us face the challenges that China and other countries present, and we should move it as quickly as we can. If the United States is going to continue to outcompete China, we need to make sure that the technologies that will define the 21st- century economy are made in American factories by American workers. The U.S. Export-Import Bank has long helped American businesses stay competitive, and our bill will empower the Ex-Im Bank to provide even more support to building here at home the industries critical to our economy and our national security. From COVID-19 to Trump's disastrous war with Iran, to China weaponizing our reliance on them for certain products, America cannot afford to depend on the unreliable when the security and prosperity of our people are at stake. Our bill would rebuild American manufacturing, strengthen our supply chains to lower costs, and give us an edge over the Chinese Communist Party, all of which--all of which--should be bipartisan priorities. For the good of the country, we can and must make progress on these issues as we reauthorize the Export-Import Bank this year. Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: S. 4781 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Make More in America Act of 2026''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Findings. Sec. 3. Purposes. Sec. 4. Modification of powers and functions. Sec. 5. Make More in America Program. Sec. 6. Modification of aggregate loan, guarantee, and insurance authority. Sec. 7. Modification of default rate and lending cap. Sec. 8. Investment Committee. Sec. 9. Interagency coordination. Sec. 10. Limitation on eligibility for support. Sec. 11. Modification of Program on China and Transformational Exports. Sec. 12. Increase in goal for export of goods and services related to renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, and energy storage. Sec. 13. Employment authority. Sec. 14. Expansion of guarantee coverage. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The People's Republic of China poses a significant competitive threat to the United States, accounting, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, for 35 percent of manufacturing volume globally and 29 percent of [[Page S2787]] value-add (as opposed to 12 percent of volume and 16 percent of value-add for the United States). The People's Republic of China continues to gain ground in higher value-add technologies that were traditionally United States strengths. (2) The People's Republic of China's increased competitiveness can be traced to multiple sources, including coordinated initiatives such as Made in China 2025, which channeled resources toward manufacturing in higher value-add industries. However, the People's Republic of China also, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, leads in research and development in 66 of 74 areas. (3) Taken together, the two trends described in paragraphs (1) and (2) suggest that the People's Republic of China's lead in exports will grow, not shrink, unless serious action is taken by the United States to strengthen its domestic innovation and industrial investment. (4) This is especially true for critical industries of the future, such as next-generation automotives and drones, industrial automation, biotechnology, biomanufacturing, quantum technology, and fusion energy, unless the United States takes steps to support technology development in those markets. Many of those markets are, or could be, vital export opportunities with meaningful economic, national security, and job creation implications for the United States. (5) The United States also faces supply chain vulnerabilities in critical inputs for those industries of the future, including energy, semiconductors and associated technologies like circuit boards, critical minerals, batteries, and other technology components. (6) Capital-intensive industries with long production cycles, such as shipbuilding, chemical processing, and nuclear energy systems, face particularly acute financing challenges during the commercialization phase and the scaling of domestic production. Similarly, drone manufacturing and advanced robotics require coordinated investments in both production capacity and workforce training that private markets struggle to provide. The result is that countries with patient public capital, particularly the People's Republic of China, have captured dominant market positions in sectors where United States innovation initially led. (7) If the United States does not respond, manufacturers in the People's Republic of China will continue gaining global market share in critical technologies at the expense of United States companies and the United States stands to lose critical industries that provide jobs, create production capacity, and serve essential national security goals. (8) As such, Federal policy should focus on ensuring that technologies that are invented and developed in the United States are commercialized and produced in the United States, along with the products and services those technologies create. That will require a whole-of-government effort dedicated to revitalizing the ``innovation and industrial infrastructure'' of the United States. (9) While this is a multi-faceted issue that the Export- Import Bank of the United States (in this section referred to as the ``Bank'') cannot solve alone, the Bank can play a much more strategic role than the Bank is playing as of the date of the enactment of this Act by supporting the development phase of future technologies in areas that are underfunded by existing private sector tools. (10) The Bank has an opportunity to create the export markets of tomorrow by helping to fund the development, commercialization, and production of critical technologies in the United States, which will expand the long-term export base of the United States by increasing the overall competitive edge of the United States, and in doing so, support employment in the United States. (11) There exists an opportunity to enhance the Bank's strategic planning capabilities and deepen the Bank's focus on catalytic and scale-up financing. Such a repositioning would support technologies with substantial domestic manufacturing footprints in industries that represent not only strategic national security and competitiveness priorities but also significant employment opportunities across manufacturing communities in the United States. (12) Congress has already directed the Bank to undertake efforts in that direction, such as through the Program on China and Transformational Exports established under section 2(l) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (12 U.S.C. 635(l)), which explicitly requires 20 percent of the Bank's funds to be invested in certain areas deemed highly strategic, including artificial intelligence, biotechnology, renewable energy, semiconductors, quantum technology, and fusion energy, among other industries. A logical next step would be to expand that program to broaden its aperture and importance within the Bank, while reaffirming the Bank's mission to support export-related transactions that directly support United States jobs. (13) In 2022, the Bank's Board of Directors with a unanimous vote launched the Make More in America Initiative to support ``export-oriented domestic manufacturing projects'', extending some of the Bank's existing demand- driven, export-contingent financing programs to a more domestic focus to help revitalize United States manufacturing, directly support United States jobs, improve the resiliency of domestic supply chains, and level the playing field for United States companies competing in overseas markets. (14) There is an opportunity for the Bank to play a convening role in developing a cohesive investment roadmap for the Bank's own mandate, informed by input from across the Federal Government, including the industrial investment efforts of other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, and the Small Business Administration. SEC. 3. PURPOSES. The purposes of th Referenced legislation: S4781, S4781