Floor SpeechNeutral2024-12-19

FORT ONTARIO HOLOCAUST REFUGEE SHELTER NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK ESTABLISHMENT ACT

ImmigrationEconomyTaxesEnvironmentDefenseTradeLaborInfrastructure

Context

On 2024-12-19, Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) delivered a floor speech titled "FORT ONTARIO HOLOCAUST REFUGEE SHELTER NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK ESTABLISHMENT ACT" in the Senate. The speech addressed immigration and also covered the economy, taxes. It referenced legislation including S7193, S7196, S2742, among other bills.

Full Text

FORT ONTARIO HOLOCAUST REFUGEE SHELTER NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK ESTABLISHMENT ACT

Congressional Record, Volume 170 Issue 189 (Thursday, December 19, 2024) [Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 189 (Thursday, December 19, 2024)] [Senate] [Pages S7193-S7196] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] FORT ONTARIO HOLOCAUST REFUGEE SHELTER NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK ESTABLISHMENT ACT A bill (S. 2742) to establish the Fort Ontario National Monument in the State of New York as a unit of the National Park System, and for other purposes, which had been reported from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources with an amendment to strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Fort Ontario Holocaust Refugee Shelter National Historical Park Establishment Act''. SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) Map.--The term ``map'' means the map entitled ``Fort Ontario Holocaust Refugee Shelter National Historical Park Proposed Boundary'', numbered 962/194,681, and dated September 2024. (2) National historical park.--The term ``National Historical Park'' means the Fort Ontario Holocaust Refugee Shelter National Historical Park established by section 3(a)(1). (3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the Interior. (4) State.--The term ``State'' means the State of New York. SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF FORT ONTARIO HOLOCAUST REFUGEE SHELTER NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (3), there is established in the State as a unit of the National Park System the Fort Ontario Holocaust Refugee Shelter National Historical Park. (2) Purpose.--The purpose of the National Historical Park is to preserve, protect, and interpret for the benefit of present and future generations resources associated with the stories of the 982 refugees from World War II who were housed at Fort Ontario from August of 1944 until February of 1946. (3) Conditions of establishment.-- (A) Determination by the secretary.--The National Historical Park shall not be established until the date on which the Secretary determines that a sufficient quantity of land or interests in land has been acquired from land identified as ``Proposed Boundary'' on the map to constitute a manageable park unit. (B) Notice.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Secretary makes a determination under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register notice of the establishment of the National Historical Park. (4) Map.--The map shall be on file and available for public inspection in the appropriate offices of the National Park Service. (5) Boundary.--The boundary of the National Historical Park shall include any land or interests in land acquired by the Secretary under this section. (b) Administration.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary shall administer the National Historical Park in accordance with-- (A) this section; and (B) the laws generally applicable to units of the National Park System, including-- (i) sections 100101(a), 100751(a), 100752, 100753, and 102101 of title 54, United States Code; and (ii) chapters 1003 and 3201 of title 54, United States Code. (2) Agreements.-- (A) Cooperative agreements.--In accordance with section 101702 of title 54, United States Code, the Secretary may enter into cooperative agreements with the State or other public and private entities to provide interpretive and educational services within the National Historical Park. (B) Interpretation and restoration agreements.--The Secretary may enter into agreements to identify, interpret, and restore nationally significant historic or cultural resources located on non-Federal land within the boundary of, or in close proximity to, the National Historical Park. (C) Public access.--Any cooperative agreement entered into under subparagraph (B) to provide assistance to non-Federal land shall provide for reasonable public access to the non- Federal land. (3) Acquisition of land.-- (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the Secretary may acquire land and interests in land located within the boundary of the National Historical Park by-- (i) donation; (ii) purchase with donated or appropriated funds; or (iii) exchange. (B) Limitation.--Any land owned by the State or a political subdivision of the State may be acquired for inclusion in the National Historical Park only by donation. (4) Management plan.--Not later than 3 fiscal years after the date on which funds are made available to carry out this section, the Secretary, in consultation with the State, shall complete a general management plan for the National Historical Park in accordance with-- (A) section 100502 of title 54, United States Code; and (B) any other applicable laws. The committee-reported amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to. The bill (S. 2742), as amended, was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read a third time, and passed. Mrs. GILLIBRAND. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. King). Without objection, it is so ordered. Department of Defense Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, last week, I came to the floor to speak [[Page S7194]] about a new acronym that we are becoming more and more familiar with-- DOGE, or the Department of Government Efficiency--that will be led by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy. One of the priorities I am looking forward to working with DOGE on to accomplish, as a founding member of the caucus, is to reform and, hopefully, revitalize the Pentagon. As I have said repeatedly, we are living in one of the most dangerous times since World War II. So it is absolutely critical that our systems at the Pentagon are operating in top-notch shape. But as we know, as of now, many of the acquisition processes the Pentagon follows are similar, if not identical, to those followed by the Soviet Union back in the day. If you know your history, the United States beat the Soviet Union when the wall fell and when the Soviet Union collapsed. So it is obvious that their model doesn't work very well, and neither did their system of military procurement. But, as I mentioned last week, where and how we spend our money is just as important as how much we spend. We seem to be fixated on the ``how much'' but not how and where the money is spent. Preparing for the strategic competition we are in the midst of is not as simple as just increasing the percentage of the spending of GDP. We need to make sure that the money that is spent is spent efficiently and accurately, meeting the needs of the world--the dangerous world--we live in. The end of the Cold War brought us a peace dividend, but one consequence of that victory was the overwhelming consolidation of the defense industrial base and the weakening of our supply chains. In the early 1990s, we had several hundred companies participating in our national defense industrial base. Today, we have five. The lack of competition in this area, combined with our penchant for requiring unique defense systems, has hampered our bargaining power and led to waste and abuse. The use of cost-plus contracts shifts the risk of cost overruns to the government. As a result, it is not unusual to find projects delayed by years and running hundreds of millions of dollars over budget. Take, for example, undersea autonomous vehicles. Boeing was contracted to deliver five Orca vehicles for about $379 million in 2022. Yet here we are $620 million later with an anticipated delivery date of 2025. If we keep going at this rate, we simply will not be prepared for the confrontation from the authoritarian axis that is quickly coming our way. But the good news is this story doesn't have to end the way the Soviet Union did. We are, after all, the United States of America, and I am optimistic we can learn from the mistakes other countries have made in the past to win this strategic competition with the axis of authoritarians. I am hopeful that by implementing reforms, we can pivot from the path we are on to one of peace through strength. Ultimately, the goal should be deterrence, preventing the next war. The Pentagon should move away from cost-plus contracts toward reliance on fixed-price contracts. Under a fixed-price model, cost overruns are borne by the contractor instead of the buyer, which, in this case, is the Pentagon. This is just a commonsense best practice that should be the standard model to incentivize productivity and efficient operations. Newer, nontraditional defense companies like Anduril and Palantir, as well as Elon Musk's SpaceX in my home State of Texas, have made a strong case for this commonsense business approach. These companies have leveraged billions of dollars in our capital markets, perhaps our greatest strategic advantage when compared to our adversaries, to produce quality defense items at unmatched scale and speed. They also provide important and critical jobs across a variety of skill levels, often in a low-cost-of-living, high-growth opportunity area. This helps revitalize our towns and communities in need of new industries to reinvigorate their job markets. This model underscores the need to transition away from our centralized, Soviet-style acquisition process, first created in the 1960s, to a more agile model which leverages the private sector to strengthen our national defense. In addition to shifting our model for procurement and acquisition, we need to change the risk-averse culture at the Department of Defense. I don't mean taking unnecessary risks; I mean taking calculated risks where called for and where indicated. Newer entities, such as the Defense Innovation Unit or the Office of Strategic Capital, are willing to assume greater risks since they understand the need for rapid acquisit

Referenced legislation: S2742, S2742, S4444

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FORT ONTARIO HOLOCAUST REFUGEE SHELTER NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK ESTABLISHMENT ACT Congressional Record, Volume 170 Issue 189 (Thursday, December 19, 2024) [Congressional Record Volume 170, Number 189 (Thursday, December 19, 2024)] [Senate] [Pages S7193-S7196] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] FORT ONTARIO HOLOCAUST REFUGEE SHELTER NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK ESTABLISHMENT ACT A bill (S. 2742) to establish the Fort Ontario National Monument in the State of New York as a unit of the National Park System, and for other purposes, which had been reported from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources with an amendment to strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Fort Ontario Holocaust Refugee Shelter National Historical Park Establishment Act''. SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) Map.--The term ``map'' means the map entitled ``Fort Ontario Holocaust Refugee Shelter National Historical Park Proposed Boundary'', numbered 962/194,681, and dated September 2024. (2) National historical park.--The term ``National Historical Park'' means the Fort Ontario Holocaust Refugee Shelter National Historical Park established by section 3(a)(1). (3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the Interior. (4) State.--The term ``State'' means the State of New York. SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF FORT ONTARIO HOLOCAUST REFUGEE SHELTER NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (3), there is established in the State as a unit of the National Park System the Fort Ontario Holocaust Refugee Shelter National Historical Park. (2) Purpose.--The purpose of the National Historical Park is to preserve, protect, and interpret for the benefit of present and future generations resources associated with the stories of the 982 refugees from World War II who were housed at Fort Ontario from August of 1944 until February of 1946. (3) Conditions of establishment.-- (A) Determination by the secretary.--The National Historical Park shall not be established until the date on which the Secretary determines that a sufficient quantity of land or interests in land has been acquired from land identified as ``Proposed Boundary'' on the map to constitute a manageable park unit. (B) Notice.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Secretary makes a determination under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register notice of the establishment of the National Historical Park. (4) Map.--The map shall be on file and available for public inspection in the appropriate offices of the National Park Service. (5) Boundary.--The boundary of the National Historical Park shall include any land or interests in land acquired by the Secretary under this section. (b) Administration.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary shall administer the National Historical Park in accordance with-- (A) this section; and (B) the laws generally applicable to units of the National Park System, including-- (i) sections 100101(a), 100751(a), 100752, 100753, and 102101 of title 54, United States Code; and (ii) chapters 1003 and 3201 of title 54, United States Code. (2) Agreements.-- (A) Cooperative agreements.--In accordance with section 101702 of title 54, United States Code, the Secretary may enter into cooperative agreements with the State or other public and private entities to provide interpretive and educational services within the National Historical Park. (B) Interpretation and restoration agreements.--The Secretary may enter into agreements to identify, interpret, and restore nationally significant historic or cultural resources located on non-Federal land within the boundary of, or in close proximity to, the National Historical Park. (C) Public access.--Any cooperative agreement entered into under subparagraph (B) to provide assistance to non-Federal land shall provide for reasonable public access to the non- Federal land. (3) Acquisition of land.-- (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the Secretary may acquire land and interests in land located within the boundary of the National Historical Park by-- (i) donation; (ii) purchase with donated or appropriated funds; or (iii) exchange. (B) Limitation.--Any land owned by the State or a political subdivision of the State may be acquired for inclusion in the National Historical Park only by donation. (4) Management plan.--Not later than 3 fiscal years after the date on which funds are made available to carry out this section, the Secretary, in consultation with the State, shall complete a general management plan for the National Historical Park in accordance with-- (A) section 100502 of title 54, United States Code; and (B) any other applicable laws. The committee-reported amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to. The bill (S. 2742), as amended, was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read a third time, and passed. Mrs. GILLIBRAND. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. King). Without objection, it is so ordered. Department of Defense Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, last week, I came to the floor to speak [[Page S7194]] about a new acronym that we are becoming more and more familiar with-- DOGE, or the Department of Government Efficiency--that will be led by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy. One of the priorities I am looking forward to working with DOGE on to accomplish, as a founding member of the caucus, is to reform and, hopefully, revitalize the Pentagon. As I have said repeatedly, we are living in one of the most dangerous times since World War II. So it is absolutely critical that our systems at the Pentagon are operating in top-notch shape. But as we know, as of now, many of the acquisition processes the Pentagon follows are similar, if not identical, to those followed by the Soviet Union back in the day. If you know your history, the United States beat the Soviet Union when the wall fell and when the Soviet Union collapsed. So it is obvious that their model doesn't work very well, and neither did their system of military procurement. But, as I mentioned last week, where and how we spend our money is just as important as how much we spend. We seem to be fixated on the ``how much'' but not how and where the money is spent. Preparing for the strategic competition we are in the midst of is not as simple as just increasing the percentage of the spending of GDP. We need to make sure that the money that is spent is spent efficiently and accurately, meeting the needs of the world--the dangerous world--we live in. The end of the Cold War brought us a peace dividend, but one consequence of that victory was the overwhelming consolidation of the defense industrial base and the weakening of our supply chains. In the early 1990s, we had several hundred companies participating in our national defense industrial base. Today, we have five. The lack of competition in this area, combined with our penchant for requiring unique defense systems, has hampered our bargaining power and led to waste and abuse. The use of cost-plus contracts shifts the risk of cost overruns to the government. As a result, it is not unusual to find projects delayed by years and running hundreds of millions of dollars over budget. Take, for example, undersea autonomous vehicles. Boeing was contracted to deliver five Orca vehicles for about $379 million in 2022. Yet here we are $620 million later with an anticipated delivery date of 2025. If we keep going at this rate, we simply will not be prepared for the confrontation from the authoritarian axis that is quickly coming our way. But the good news is this story doesn't have to end the way the Soviet Union did. We are, after all, the United States of America, and I am optimistic we can learn from the mistakes other countries have made in the past to win this strategic competition with the axis of authoritarians. I am hopeful that by implementing reforms, we can pivot from the path we are on to one of peace through strength. Ultimately, the goal should be deterrence, preventing the next war. The Pentagon should move away from cost-plus contracts toward reliance on fixed-price contracts. Under a fixed-price model, cost overruns are borne by the contractor instead of the buyer, which, in this case, is the Pentagon. This is just a commonsense best practice that should be the standard model to incentivize productivity and efficient operations. Newer, nontraditional defense companies like Anduril and Palantir, as well as Elon Musk's SpaceX in my home State of Texas, have made a strong case for this commonsense business approach. These companies have leveraged billions of dollars in our capital markets, perhaps our greatest strategic advantage when compared to our adversaries, to produce quality defense items at unmatched scale and speed. They also provide important and critical jobs across a variety of skill levels, often in a low-cost-of-living, high-growth opportunity area. This helps revitalize our towns and communities in need of new industries to reinvigorate their job markets. This model underscores the need to transition away from our centralized, Soviet-style acquisition process, first created in the 1960s, to a more agile model which leverages the private sector to strengthen our national defense. In addition to shifting our model for procurement and acquisition, we need to change the risk-averse culture at the Department of Defense. I don't mean taking unnecessary risks; I mean taking calculated risks where called for and where indicated. Newer entities, such as the Defense Innovation Unit or the Office of Strategic Capital, are willing to assume greater risks since they understand the need for rapid acquisit Referenced legislation: S2742, S2742, S4444