Text of Senate Amendment 5894

On 2026-06-22, Senator John Thune (R-SD) delivered a floor speech titled "Text Of Senate Amendment 5894" in the Senate.

Text of Senate Amendment 5894

Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 104 (Monday, June 22, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 104 (Monday, June 22, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S3015-S3017] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 5894. Mr. THUNE (for Mr. Curtis (for himself and Ms. Rosen)) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by Mr. Thune to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of title XII, add the following: Subtitle F--Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act SEC. 1281. SHORT TITLE. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act''. SEC. 1282. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security of Taiwan and change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025. (2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Taiwan that could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of critical undersea infrastructure would significantly impact the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, economic, and social functions. (3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to Taiwan's critical infrastructure. (4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage critical undersea infrastructure is a critical element of its strategy aimed at disrupting Taiwan's military and civil communications and isolating Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or other attempt to force unification with the PRC. (5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption to critical undersea infrastructure serving Taiwan and other nations, including-- (A) in February 2023, two vessels registered to the PRC severed two undersea cables that effectively cut internet access to the 13,000 residents of Taiwan's Matsu Islands, who had to rely on microwave radio transmissions to provide limited internet access for 50 days until a cable ship was able to complete repairs; (B) in January 2025, Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an undersea cable north of Taipei and identified a ``suspicious vessel'' registered as the Shunxin-39 and the Xin Shun-39, which had traveled in a criss-cross pattern while dragging its anchor near where the cable was damaged; (C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged vessel named the Baoshun was driven away by Taiwan's coast guard after suspicious movements off the coast of New Taipei; and (D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast guard detained the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu Islands after an undersea cable in the area was severed, with the captain later admitting to dropping the ship's anchor in the area and that he ``might have broken the cable''. (6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in several incidents. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure, as well as the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable. (7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international security while falling short of direct military confrontation. (8) Several regional mechanisms have been established to bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific. (9) Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy by purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in the global information and communications technology supply chain. Any restrictions to its internet connectivity or energy security would have a direct impact on the world's economy. (10) To counter the threats described in this section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for critical undersea infrastructure and foster international cooperation to protect those critical assets. SEC. 1283. DEFINITIONS. In this subtitle: [[Page S3016]] (1) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical undersea infrastructure'' means-- (A) subsea energy infrastructure, including a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, to transmit electricity (including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations) or to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure, as well as associated landing stations and facilities; or (B) subsea telecommunications infrastructure, including subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as associated landing stations and facilities. (2) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause defective production of, operation of, or damage to critical undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure. SEC. 1284. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE. (a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to be known as the ``Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative'' (in this section referred to as the ``Initiative''). (b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the PRC. (c) Key Focus Areas.-- (1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced critical undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable of detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time, including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early warnings about risks to Taiwan's critical undersea infrastructure from global intelligence networks. (2) Rapid response protocols.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall-- (A) in cooperation with regional partners, establish rapid response protocols for damaged critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating disruptions; and (B) work with allies and partners of the United States to help Taiwan and regional partners develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure and minimize downtime. (3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out the Initiative-- (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or activities near critical undersea infrastructure; and (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding maritime zones, to monitor potential threats and prevent sabotage. (4) International frameworks for protection.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to establish cooperative frameworks with regional and global partners to protect undersea cable networks near Taiwan. (B) Elements.--The frameworks established under subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to enhance collective security against sabotage. (5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support the hardening of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and sabotage. SEC. 1285. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS. (a) Working With Partners To Counter PRC Sabotage.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to implement strategies that directly counter the Government of the PRC's critical undersea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to adhere to international norms regarding the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. (b) Raising