Floor SpeechNeutral2026-06-23

Text of Senate Amendment 6013

Adam B. Schiff
Adam B. Schiff
DCA · Senator
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Context

On 2026-06-23, Senator Adam B. Schiff (D-CA) delivered a floor speech titled "Text Of Senate Amendment 6013" in the Senate.

Full Text

Text of Senate Amendment 6013

Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 105 (Tuesday, June 23, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 105 (Tuesday, June 23, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S3143-S3144] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6013. Mr. SCHIFF submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, [[Page S3144]] and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place in subtitle G of title X, insert the following: SEC. ___. COLLABORATION ON ADVERSARIAL THREATS AND AI SECURITY RISKS. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Antitrust laws; non-federal entity.--The terms ``antitrust laws'' and ``non-Federal entity'' have the meanings given those terms, respectively, in section 102 of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501). (2) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial intelligence'' has the meaning given that term in section 238(g) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. 4001 note). (3) Assistance.--The term ``assistance'' includes the provision of software, hardware, data, personnel, and other resources. (4) Covered artificial intelligence security purpose.--The term ``covered artificial intelligence security purpose'' means the purpose of protecting against, identifying, evaluating, testing, analyzing, preventing, investigating, or mitigating a covered artificial intelligence security risk. (5) Covered artificial intelligence security risk.--The term ``covered artificial intelligence security risk'' means the potential for artificial intelligence, including during development, training, testing, evaluation, deployment, use, or release, to do 1 or more of the following: (A) Substantially facilitate the development or deployment of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or offensive cyber weapon. (B) Cause a disruption to, degradation of, impairment of, or loss of operational control over critical infrastructure that is reasonably likely to result in a significant impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof. (C) Substantially reduce the ability of a developer, deployer, owner, operator, user, evaluator, auditor, Federal department or agency, or other governmental authority to oversee, evaluate, monitor, control, contain, restrict access to, disable, or terminate such artificial intelligence, if the applicable person or governmental authority has authority or responsibility to do so, including through unauthorized, deceptive, evasive, or malicious activity involving such artificial intelligence. (D) Autonomously improve, or substantially facilitate the autonomous improvement of the capabilities of artificial intelligence in a manner that creates a reasonable risk of a consequence described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C). (E) Be stolen, weaponized, trained, developed, or deployed by a covered nation (as defined in section 4872(f)(2) of title 10, United States Code) or an entity owned, controlled, or directed by a covered nation in a manner that poses a significant threat to the national security, including through covert, clandestine, undisclosed, or otherwise concealed development activities that attempt to evade detection or verification. (F) Be vulnerable to unauthorized access that-- (i) creates a substantial risk of a consequence described in subparagraphs (A) through (D); or (ii) is for the benefit of, at the direction of, or under the control of-- (I) a covered nation (as defined in section 4872(f)(2) of title 10, United States Code); or (II) an entity owned, controlled, or directed by a covered nation. (6) Exclusive purpose.--The term ``exclusive purpose'', with respect to the provision of information or assistance, means for the purpose of, with not more than an insubstantial part of the information or assistance being for other purposes. (7) Unauthorized access.--The term ``unauthorized access'' with respect to artificial intelligence-- (A) means unauthorized access or use of artificial intelligence; and (B) includes-- (i) extraction or copying of model weights, parameters, or other nonpublic model information; (ii) systematic querying or automated extraction designed to distill, replicate, or reconstruct model capabilities; and (iii) compromise affecting the integrity, reliability, or security of artificial intelligence, including through malicious code, a backdoor, manipulated data, or compromise of an artificial intelligence model, training dataset, or artificial intelligence component. (b) Antitrust Exemption.-- (1) In general.--It shall not be considered a violation of any provision of the antitrust laws for-- (A) 2 or more non-Federal entities to provide or exchange information or assistance relating to a covered artificial intelligence security risk in good faith for the exclusive purpose of a covered artificial intelligence security purpose; or (B) 2 or more non-Federal entities to provide or exchange information or assistance for the exclusive purpose of coordinating strategies to reduce covered artificial intelligence security risks via delaying or otherwise limiting the release, deployment, use, development, training, testing, or evaluation of artificial intelligence, provided that the non-Federal entities submit prior written notice of the proposed coordinated delay or limitation to the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission, detailing the specific covered artificial intelligence security risk and the scope of the proposed restriction. (2) Limitation.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a non- Federal entity receiving information or assistance unless the non-Federal entity uses such information or assistance for a covered artificial intelligence security purpose and has implemented reasonable internal controls to limit the extent to which such information or assistance can be used for other purposes. (3) Affirmative defense.--In any action or proceeding brought under the antitrust laws, the exemption provided under paragraph (1) shall constitute an affirmative defense, and any non-Federal entity claiming the exemption shall bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the entity's actions were taken in good faith and for the exclusive purpose described in paragraph (1). (4) Rule of construction.--Paragraph (1)(A) shall not be construed to permit price-fixing, allocating a market between competitors, monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a market, boycotting, or exchanges of price or cost information. (5) Exemption from disclosure.--Any information submitted to the Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission pursuant to paragraph (1)(B), including any written notice submitted under that subsection and any information derived from such submission that would reveal the substance of such submission, shall be-- (A) used solely for the purpose of subsection (c); (B) deemed voluntarily shared information and exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code; and (C) withheld, without discretion, from the public under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code. (c) Injunctive Relief.-- (1) In general.--The Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission may seek, in a court of competent jurisdiction, an injunction against the initiation or continuation of the provision or exchange of information or assistance by non- Federal entities described in section 3 that violates the antitrust laws if the Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission determines that the non-Federal entities are not acting in good faith or are otherwise unreasonably engaging in anticompetitive acts. (2) Rules of construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to-- (A) create any immunity or exemption from the antitrust laws if the Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission determines that the non-Federal entities are not acting in good faith or are otherwise unreasonably engaging in anticompetitive acts; or (B) to limit any private right of action for any violation of the antitrust laws that is not exempt under subsection (b). ______
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